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Abstract: The Kakamega Forest is the last remaining rainforest in Kenya and provides 
over 200,000 locals with important forest resources. This paper explores the role of local 
institutions (i.e. forest-use rules) on deforestation and degradation in the Kaimosi Forest, 
a smaller portion of the Kakamega Forest.  Drawing from common property theory, this 
study examines various factors previously identified with successful management 
practices of common property forest resources. Additionally, this study draws from 
Cultural and Political Ecology (CAPE) perspectives to broaden the analysis of this people 
and forest relationship to include the role of household decision-making and power 
struggles among individual actors. The Kaimosi Forest is owned and managed by Kenyan 
Quaker Mission Church (QMC) that allows approximately 3,000 locals to use the forest 
while abiding by local institutions, or forest-use rules. Specifically, this paper looks at 
differing local perceptions with the QMC management, and how such rules influence 
forest-use and impact local livelihoods.  The field methods include participant-
observation techniques, 12 key-informant interviews, and 68 household surveys.  The 
statistical methods for analyzing the household dataset include two-independent samples 
t-test and Pearson’s correlations. The analysis compares a stratified sample of two 
villages surrounding the Kaimosi Forest. Variables include household level: 
demographics, land-use, livelihood, forest-use, and perception of local institutions.  
Results show that a revised management plan should be implemented by the QMC, and 
implemented in collaboration with local government leaders, the Kenyan Forest Service, 
and local residents in order to reduce pressures on forest resources. Furthermore, more 
forest commons studies are needed in the other parts of the Kakamega area to better 
understand why the smaller Kaimosi Forest fragment is undergoing the highest levels of 
deforestation and degradation.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Research Problem 
 The Kaimosi Forest in Western Kenya is a 1,000 acre forest plot owned by the 
Quaker Mission Church (QMC). The church allows locals to communally use the forest 
while abiding by the institutions, or forest-use rules. The forest supplies approximately 
3,000 locals with deadwood for cooking, edible and medicinal plants, and a place for 
cultural ceremonies. However, the Kaimosi Forest, a small fragment of the larger 
Kakamega Forest, is also undergoing the most rapid deforestation and degradation in the 
region of Western Kenya (Lung and Schaab 2006). 
 This study compares two villages surrounding the Kaimosi Forest in terms of 
household demographics, land-use, livelihood, forest-use, and perception of the local 
institutions (forest-use rules) in relation to the recent deforestation and degradation. The 
two selected villages are the perceived least and most successful villages in terms of 
commons natural resource management.  Drawing from Common Property Theory and 
Cultural and Political Ecology (CAPE) literatures, this study seeks to better understand 
complex people and forest dynamics.   
.
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The research questions include: 
 
1) What are the major socio-economic and demographic factors that influence 
household land-use decisions and forest extraction?   
 
2) How are local forest institutions created, implemented, monitored, and 
enforced in the Kaimosi Forest?    
 
3) How do local perceptions among households and other actors differ regarding 
the institutions currently operating in the Kaimosi Forest? 3b) How do these 
differences impact forest-use and local livelihoods?  
 
  These questions seek to explain how institutions (i.e. forest-use rules) impact 
local livelihoods and deforestation and degradation in the Kaimosi Forest.  Past commons 
studies show that local institutions must be properly implemented in order to accomplish 
long-term sustainable resource management (Ostrom 1990). The remainder of this 
chapter discusses the importance of tropical forests and more specifically Kenyan forests. 
Furthermore, a discussion is provided regarding the environmental issues facing 
Kakamega and Kaimosi Forest and a brief history and description of the study area.     
Importance of Tropical Forests 
 Tropical forests play an essential role in regulating, provisioning, and supporting 
the ecosystem and natural resources (Muller and Mburu 2009). For instance, tropical 
forests influence the microclimate, regulate local water cycles, and provide vegetative 
cover that prevents soil erosion and retains subsoil nutrients (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment 2005; Muller and Mburu 2009). The role and importance of tropical forests 
in sustaining the world’s population is becoming more evident (Duveiller et al. 2008); 
however, they are suffering from rapid land-use changes (Wright 2005). Approximately 
13 million hectares of forest cover is lost each year due to deforestation (FAO 2011).  
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Annually, tropical deforestation is responsible for approximately 2.2 Gigatons of carbon 
emissions, which accounts for one-fourth of all anthropogenic emissions worldwide 
(Fearnside and Laurance 2004). The high level of carbon emissions makes tropical 
deforestation a main driver of environmental change at various spatial scales (Geist and 
Lambin 2002). Degradation is also a main cause of global land-use and land cover 
change. In tropical forests, degradation accounts for 50 percent of the total deforestation 
rate (Murdiyarso et al. 2008).  
At a global scale, deforestation and degradation causes significant biodiversity 
loss, affects the hydrologic balance, and global carbon cycles (Allen and Barnes 1985; 
Fearnside and Laurance 2004). Locally, deforestation and degradation decreases the 
quality of rural life, negatively affects soil and water cycles, and diminishes (e.g. fuel 
wood) used for household energy (FAO 2011). Although the precise measure of global 
deforestation and degradation has been disputed, the consequences are apparent, 
especially in developing countries where forest dependency is most prevalent (Allen and 
Barnes 1985; Grainger 2008).  
Deforestation and Degradation in Africa 
 According to the Global Forest Resources Assessment (FRA) 2010, an estimated 
675 million hectares of forest area remains in Africa, accounting for 17 percent of global 
forest area and 23 percent total land area in Africa (FAO 2011). The extent of forest 
designated for production of wood and non-wood forest products declined over the past 
20 years; however, the value of wood removals increased in the region from $2.6 billion 
in 1990 to $2.9 billion in 2005 (FAO 2011). Since 1990, 15 million hectares of planted 
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forest area has been added, with the biggest portion being in North Africa (FAO 2011). It 
must be noted that researchers have questioned the accuracy of FAO data for tropical 
forest trends (Grainger 2008).  Regardless, FAO data is still beneficial to show general 
trends.   
Although deforestation rates have slightly decreased in the last decade, from 3.4 
million hectares per year between 1990 and 2000 and another 3.2 million hectares per 
year in the subsequent decade, from 2000-2010 (FAO 2011), the rate of loss is still 
alarming for researchers and policy makers due to its severe local and regional effects on 
climate and livelihoods (Archard et al. 2002; Geist and Lambin 2002).  The plausible 
causes of deforestation and degradation in tropical African forests are attributed to private 
timber logging, mining, charcoal production, fuel wood for domestic uses, urbanization, 
and agricultural expansion (Mather, Needle, and Fairbairn 1998; Duveiller et al. 2008; 
Wright 2005).  The underlying driving forces are often in-migration patterns and 
population growth, which create a demand for cropland and forest products (Geist and 
Lambin 2002; Wright 2005).  In eastern Africa, cropland has expanded by 200 percent 
from 1900 to 1990 (Goldweijk 2001). The highly populated East African region makes 
up approximately 11 percent of the total forest in Africa (FAO 2010). In particular, 
Kenya has the most diverse forest in East Africa and the most highly fragmented (Wass 
1995).  
Kenyan Forests  
 In 2010, Kenya had 3.4 million hectares of forest consisting of 4 percent of the 
total land area (FAO 2010). Out of the 3.4 million hectares approximately 84 percent are 
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indigenous forests while the other types consist of exotic plantations, privately owned 
forests, and mangrove forests (Pellikka, Ylhaisi, and Clark 2004).   The FRA 2010 Kenya 
Report states that forest ownership consists of 10 thousand hectares of individual private 
ownership, 1.3 million hectares public ownership, and 2 million hectares of local 
community ownership (FAO 2010). From 1990 to 2010, an average of 13,000 hectares 
was deforested each year (FAO 2010). The different forest types in Kenya are lowland 
tropical forest in western Kenya and montane forest in the central and western highlands 
(Noad and Birnie 1990). Lowland forests are the most vulnerable due to agricultural 
expansion and current population pressures (Pellikka, Ylhaisi, and Clark 2004).  
Kakamega and Kaimosi Forest, Western Kenya  
 The province of Western Kenya has one of the highest rural population densities 
in the world with 600 people per square kilometer (km) and is currently undergoing rapid 
deforestation and degradation (Wass 1995; Blackett 1994; Guthiga 2008).  Located in the 
Western Province and 75 km north of Lake Victoria (see Figure 1), the Kakamega 
Rainforest is the last remaining tropical rainforest in Kenya and provides its local 
population with forest resources (Wass 1995); over 200,000 people depend on it for their 
livelihoods (Kiplagat, Mburu, and Mugendi 2008).  The Kakamega Rainforest is a mid-
latitudinal evergreen tropical rainforest and is the eastern-most extent of the Guineo-
Congolean rainforest belt that once covered the equatorial strip of Africa (Lung and 
Schaab 2006). The annual rainfall is approximately 2,000 millimeter (mm) with the rainy 
season during April to November and a dry season from December to March. The 
maximum daily temperature is approximately 26°C and the minimum approximately 
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10°C (Glenday 2006).  With an altitude ranging from 1500 to 1700 meters (m), it is 
famous for its rare diversity of flora and fauna.  
 There are indigenous tree species such as Elgon teak Olea capensis, Red 
Stinkwood Prunus africanum, and African Satinwood Zanthoxylum gilletti (Noad and 
Birnie 1990).  According to Sayer, Harcourt, and Collins (1992) the L’Hoest’s monkey is 
endemic to the Kakamega and there are two globally threatened bird species: Turner’s 
eremomela Eremomela turneri, and Chapin’s flycatcher Muscicapa lendu.   The forest 
contains the largest number of bird species in Kenya with approximately 254 types (Wass 
1995) and there is an estimated 400 varieties of butterfly species (Marttila and Virtanen 
1998). Despite the high levels of biodiversity, the forest has a long history of 
anthropogenic use leading to both deforestation and land degradation (Wass 1995; Lung 
and Schaab 2006; Bleher, Uster, and Bergsdorf 2006).  
 In the last decade, a significant increase in human-environment research has 
centered on the Kakamega Forest due to continued conflicts between forest conservation 
and land-use needs (Waas 1995; Lung and Schaab 2006).  The natural forest cover of the 
Kakamega Forest in 1913 was 74,718 hectares, while only 34 percent remained in 2001 
with 25,727 hectares (Mitchell, Lung, and Schaab 2006).  In the last three decades, over 
20 percent of the Kakamega Forest has been deforested with the majority of the 
deforested land being smaller forest fragments surrounding the perimeter of the main 
forest block (Lung and Schaab 2006).  The highly dependent local population 
surrounding the forest is often forced to over-use the forest resources, which has led to 
high levels of degradation (Kassilly and Tsingalia 2009).   
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Figure 1. Reference map of Kakamega Forest and smaller Kaimosi Forest. 
 
Map made by Daniel Wilson (February 2012) 
Source: World Resource Institute, 2010 
  Several researchers have analyzed the current status of forest management 
conservation in the Kakamega Forest (Lung and Schaab 2006; Bleher, Uster, and 
Bergsdorf 2006).  These studies support the conclusion that the Kaimosi Forest has the 
highest level of deforestation and degradation in the Kakamega Forest (Figure 1).  
Specifically, Lung and Schaab (2006) use Landsat time series imagery to analyze land-
use and cover change (LUCC) in the Kakamega Forest from 1972 to 2001.  Their 
findings indicate that the Kaimosi Forest in southern Kakamega shows “severe forest 
loss, but tiny patches of stable forest can still be made out” (Lung and Schaab 2006, 498). 
They classify the Kaimosi Forest fragment as being mainly near natural plus old 
secondary forest and find that several other forest fragments surrounding the larger 
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Kakamega Forest have been completely overtaken by agricultural land (Lung and Schaab 
2006).  
 Bleher, Uster, and Bergsdorf (2006) found that of 22 selected forest areas in the 
Kakamega Forest region, the Kaimosi Forest has the greatest issue with illegal logging.  
Unlike Lung and Schaab (2006), their methods did not involve remotely sensed data, but 
instead measured the level of deforestation by ground truthing selected sites of the 
Kakamega Forest.  Muller and Mburu (2009) present similar findings as Lung and 
Schaab (2006) regarding the level of deforestation in the Kakamega Forest. However, 
they focus less on social and economic factors, and instead point to population increase 
as the main driver of deforestation.  Regardless, out of the 8,000 hectares of remaining 
rainforest in Western Kenya, the 150 hectare Kaimosi Forest has suffered from the 
highest level of anthropogenic impacts (Lung and Schaab 2006).  
 Although the Kaimosi Forest is currently undergoing severe levels of 
deforestation (Lung and Schaab 2006), it provides medicinal plants, deadwood for 
cooking, deters soil erosion, and plays a major role in tribal ceremonies for over 3,000 
Tiriki locals. Before discussing the human-environment literature that guides this study 
(Chapter 2), it is necessary to provide a historical overview of the Kaimosi Forest in order 
to best understand the harmful environmental and social impacts caused by the recent 
deforestation and degradation. 
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Land Tenure and Encroachment in the Western Kenya Highlands 
What is misery? 
It’s a man without land 
-Swahili song 
(Roberts 1967, 126) 
The Kenya highlands are located in the Western Province, situated to the north 
above the Nandi Escarpment that stretches between the highlands and the Kavirondo Gulf 
of Lake Victoria. Before the arrival of the first British settlers in the Kenya highlands, 
social organization was focused on the extended family and livelihoods were earned by 
small scale agriculture, cattle-keeping, handicrafts, and barter (Sangree 1966).  Land 
tenure varied according to ethnic group, type of land, and the status of individuals; 
however, a common feature was the tendency to permit widespread access to land as a 
shared commons. According to Leo (1984), traditional land tenure arrangements were 
neither ‘individualist’ nor ‘communal’ in the Western sense of those terms.  Members of 
agricultural based groups acquired rights to a particular plot, but these rights did not 
exclude other members from access to land.  Thus, the land was not necessarily held in 
common, but demarcated by boundaries where individuals held land while still abiding 
by the obligations of the clan and their family (Wagner 1949; Leo 1984).    
 In 1902, Western Kenya was transferred from the Uganda Protectorate to the 
British controlled East African Protectorate (Rasmussen 1995).  In the following decades, 
British settlers introduced ‘modern’ agriculture, commerce, and industry to the region 
which in turn, created new wealth along with new poverty; each being contingent upon 
the other.  For instance, wealth was based upon the exploitation of agricultural land, 
while poverty stemmed from loss of land and exploitation of labor upon the land (Leo 
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1984).  One of the most important pre-colonial aspects of the tenancy in the Kenya 
highlands was that it required an open frontier for newly formed families.  Therefore, 
when the Europeans claimed unrestricted rights to seize unoccupied land, it deprived the 
land tenure system of its most important aspect.  As Leo (1984) states, “when the colonial 
system began to spawn landlessness, it was inflicting, from the African point of view, an 
unheard-of deprivation and committing an unspeakable outrage” (pg. 32).  Thus the 
commerce, industry, and public service brought by the Europeans did not remove the 
land grievances felt by the locals since the exclusion of traditional land usages had “cut 
the heart out of their way of life” (Leo 1984, 32).      
“White Highlands” and “Native Reserves” 
  Upon arriving in Kenya, British settlers took their pick of the fertile well-watered 
Kenya highlands.  Until 1960, this area was called the White Highlands or ‘scheduled 
areas’ that consisted of 3 million hectares of land, which was divided into approximately 
3600 farms and ranches (Odingo 1971).  During this time, locals were confined to ‘native 
reserves’ with each block of land reserved for a particular ethnic group (Rasmussen 
1995).  People in the reserves lived a peasant life including small-scale substance and 
market agricultural and animal husbandry, while relying on rudimentary technology and 
family labor (Cone and Lipscomb 1972). The newly established boundaries soon led to 
overcrowding, (i.e. ~1,000 per sq mi) and eventually severe land degradation (Sangree 
1966).  In the reserves, colonially appointed chiefs enforced the collection of heavy taxes 
levied by the colonial authorities and placed strict restrictions on commerce and 
agriculture (Sangree 1966).  For instance, restrictions included a ban on growing cash 
crops and measures designed to promote ‘correct’ agricultural practices (i.e. contour 
11	  
	  
ploughing and terracing), which often failed to achieve the desired result.   The material 
and cultural changes (i.e. railways, roads, permanent buildings, wheeled transports, 
agricultural machinery, household utensils) brought by the British were slowly integrated 
into the Africans’ way of life (Sangree 1966).  New food types where replacing old ones 
such as maize instead of millets. Also potatoes, peas, and improved varieties of beans 
were introduced (Cone and Lipscomb 1972).  The main ethnic group to experience these 
early land-use changes and the inhabitants of the Kakamega Forest region are the Luyia 
people.  
The Luyia and Tiriki People: History, Land-Use, and Livelihood 
 The Luyia people belong to the subgroup of the modern day Bantu-speaking 
group and inhabit the southwestern area of the Western Province of Kenya in the districts 
of Bungoma, Busia, Vihiga, and Kakamega (Were 1967; Ehret 1998).  The region is 
located 50 km north of Kisimu rising above the Nandi Escarpment in a lush environment 
approximately 5,000 ft in elevation (Sangree 1966; Were 1967).  Luyia are the dominant 
tribe in the Western Province and the third largest in the country with approximately 6 
million people (CIA 2012). The word ‘Luyia’ refers to the people and language and they 
are commonly referred to as the ‘Abaluyia’ meaning “people of the clan” (Were 1967). 
The Luyia are not a homogenous group of people, but are recognized as a separate entity 
from their neighbors in the Western Province, Luo speakers to the south and the highland 
Nilotic speakers to the east and north (Kanyoro 1983). The Luyia origin can be traced 
back to the western end of the African great lakes region from around 1000 BC (Ehret 
1998), reaching Kenya through Uganda around 1570 – 1600 (Were 1967).  By 1850, 
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migration was mostly complete with only minor internal movements due to drought, 
disease, and later British colonialism (Were 1967).  
There are 18 subgroups in the Luyia tribe. The Tiriki subgroup lives in the area 
surrounding the Kaimosi Forest inhabiting the lush southeastern region of the Western 
Province in the district of Vihiga.  During pre-colonial times the Tiriki tribe had an 
established society that supported all members of the tribe.  The clan’s obligations to 
provide for all created a form of social security in that as long as the clan had food, no 
member of the clan went hungry (Painter 1966). The men in the tribe were assigned a 
social grouping based off age (i.e. age-group system), which included certain social 
expectations (Sangree 1966). For instance, in the past raiding cattle was a common 
occurrence for the young men in the warrior age grade.  The Tiriki had very extensive 
funerals where the community held a celebration at the home of the deceased and 
mourning could last to 40 days, although it is much shorter now (Were 1967; Sangree 
1966).   
Currently, the official Tiriki Location (i.e. smallest governmental land division) is 
70 square miles.  Tiriki villages generally have sporadic paths connecting small isolated 
homesteads where each family lives surrounded by their crops. The family consists of 
husband, wife, and unmarried children. Polygamy was a common practice, but is rarely 
practiced today (Sangree 1966). Married sons often continue to live with their parents 
until they have their first child. The first born son is the main heir to his father, while 
daughters do not inherit property. Recently, women have been allowed to inherit property 
in accordance with the new Kenyan constitution (Kenya 2010). The gendered division of 
labor is well understood within the household.  To state Wagner’s (1949) interview with 
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an elder “It is the wife’s work to sweep, to grind, to cook, to build the fire, and to clean 
out the cattle partition. She carries the water from the spring and gathers firewood. She 
brings the salt, cleans the walls of the house and the surface of the yard with cow dung, 
and beats the floor of the house” (pg. 41). Since men do not often contribute to household 
duties, they tend to have jobs as shopkeepers, mechanics, taxi drivers, farm laborers, 
teachers, doctors, government workers, or church leaders. Although such traditional 
gender roles remain, Leo (1984) states that a level of mutual respect is found within the 
household and community.  
Although the forest is communal, all of the homesteads surrounding the Kaimosi 
Forest are considered private property. Agricultural fields, generally one acre or less in 
size, surround the homesteads.  Historically, locals practiced swidden agriculture (Cone 
and Lipscomb 1972), however residents are not currently able to allow their fields to lie 
fallow (Key-Informant Interview, 2011).  Slash and burn techniques are no longer used 
due to the high population density and diminishing forestlands. Instead residents use 
commercial fertilizer to grow the two major crops in the region; beans and corn. A small 
percent of households also grow tea and sugarcane, although both are rare in the region.  
Planting and harvesting is done by manual labor without the use of machines. 
Both men and women participate to varying degrees in farming activities, with men 
performing more of the initial physical labor required for planting and sowing, and 
women the day to day tasks. Residents have small patio gardens near their homesteads 
with cabbage, kale, tomatoes, medicinal plants, and other various vegetables.  Also near 
their homesteads, locals grow fruit trees such as banana, avocado, mango, and guava.  
Residents typically have a fairly limited diet and are often restricted primarily to their 
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crop, orchard, and garden yields for their subsistence needs. Beans and corn are also sold 
as cash crops to corporate food distributors and wholesalers; while the fruits and other 
garden vegetables are sometimes sold or traded in the local market.  
In regards to animal husbandry, cows and chickens are the two most common 
domesticated animals, which provide dairy and eggs, and occasionally meat.  For 
instance, it is custom to cook a chicken when a guest from a different region visits.  A 
small percentage of households have other domesticated animals such as ducks, goats, 
and donkeys. Households in this area tend to have very similar land-use types, although 
some exceptions do exist. 
Currently, there are seven villages closely surrounding the Kaimosi Forest: 
Cheptulu, Shipala, Bumbo, Maganda, Shamakhokho, Jivuye, and Mahanga (Key-
Informant Interview, 2011).  The closest market is located to the east in the village of 
Cheptulu. It has several supply stores, butcheries, clothing stores, and fresh vegetables 
and fruits being sold by the road.  People wear modern clothing and all but young 
children and elders speak fluent English. They also speak the national language of 
Kenya-Kiswahili as well as their mother tongue-Ludiriji, making most in the area 
trilingual. The area is dominated by different denominations of Christianity including 
Catholic, Pentecostal, and Quaker. The main mode of public transportation is twelve 
passenger vans that travel along the Kisumu-Yala main road to the neighboring villages. 
The region has one of the highest rural population densities in the world, with 600 people 
per square km (Mitchell, Lung, and Schaab 2006). Due to overpopulation, a large number 
of men travel to major cities to find work. Sangree (1966) estimated from his 1954-56 
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fieldwork that over half the Tiriki adult males had left to find work in urban areas. 
Furthermore, all Tiriki males participate in the circumcision ceremony.   
The most important Tikiri ritual is a sacred circumcision ceremony that acts as the 
basis for tribal identity and unity (Sangree 1966).  The circumcision is performed in 
special ceremony sites within the sacred groves or forested areas referred to as 
kavunyonje (Kassilly and Tsingalia 2009).  Following the circumcision the small group of 
young males spend one month isolated in the forest (Sangree 1966).  Although several 
cultural practices and beliefs have been replaced by Christianity, the ceremony is still in 
practice every four to six years and is viewed as a necessity for tribal identity (Kassilly 
and Tsingalia 2009). The first missionaries to reach the area were American Quakers who 
established their mission adjacent to the Tiriki homeland and became a strong force for 
change in the region. 
The Quaker Movement in Western Kenya 
 In 1902, the American Quakers Willis Hotchkiss, Arthur Chilson, and Edgar T. 
Hole toured the region north of Kisimu to find a suitable spot to establish a mission 
(Rasmussen 1995). After six weeks they chose an area known as Kaimosi because it had 
a small river for damming and a large hill, which offered a vantage point of the 
surrounding forest (Rasmussen 1996). The land was uninhabited at first, being east of the 
Tiriki Location and west of the Nandi Province.  The literal translation of “Kaimosi” in 
Luyia is “a grazing field commonly held by the community for the purpose of feeding 
livestock” (Key-Informant Interview 2011).  The British Government’s decision to allow 
the missionaries to purchase the 1,000 acre plot was based on the hope that their presence 
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would help deter the fighting and cattle raiding between the Tiriki and Nandi (Sangree 
1966) (see Figure 2).  Soon many Tiriki started settling to the east and north of the 
mission to obtain help from the missionary allies.  In 1905, the mission hired African 
guards to help protect the Tiriki cattle (Rasmussen 1995).  Shortly following in 1907, the 
British Administration dispatched a field force against the Nandi putting an end to all 
major hostilities and fixing the boundaries of the Nandi.  Moreover, the British 
recognized the eastward extension of the Tiriki boundary to the newly inhabited areas 
surrounding the Kaimosi Mission (Sangree 1966).   
Figure 2. The Kaimosi Forest and the Quaker Mission Church Boundary 
 
Map made by Daniel Wilson (February 2012) 
Imagery Source: Google Earth Imagery, 2011 
 A sawmill dam was completed at Kaimosi in 1904 which supplied power for 
cutting the hard wood trees into boards and grinding grain into meal (Rasmussen 1996).  
This was to be the first of many social amenities that the church provided for the locals in 
the area.  The American Friends Board of Missions made Kaimosi their center for all 
development and expansion in Western Kenya.   
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 The political economy of colonial Kenya was premised upon the settler core of 
“scheduled areas” and a periphery of African “native reserves” (Gould 1989).  The main 
function of the reserves was to provide a labor force for the urban and rural sectors of the 
settler economy (Leo 1984).  The missionaries realized that training locals for industrial 
work was equally as important as spreading Christianity.  The Tiriki people had several 
periods of high resistance towards the missionaries, but over time church membership 
continued to grow as the church introduced new social amenities (Rasmussen 1996). For 
instance, during the Kenyan famine of 1918, the Quaker Mission Church (QMC) along 
with the British Administration, for the first time, distributed maize meal to alleviate 
starvation. This in turn helped diminish early Tiriki suspicion regarding the QMC and 
caused maize to become the most widely used crop in the area (Sangree 1966).  
 Currently, there are two public primary schools and two private secondary schools 
(male and female), post office, hospital, teacher training college, technical college, and a 
hydroelectric dam all within the 1,000 acre QMC property (Rasmussen 1996). Although 
the QMC owns all of the land within the plot, there are several government owned and 
operated schools within the mission boundary.  Within the past three years, there has 
been an attempt to start building ‘Friends University, Kaimosi’, a college that would be 
affiliated with Masinde Muliro University in the city of Kakamega, located one hour to 
the north of the Kaimosi Forest (Key-Informant Interview 2011).  The QMC allows 
locals to use the forest for medicinal plant and deadwood collection (i.e. for cooking); 
however, the remaining forested areas are quickly diminishing (Lung and Schaab 2006). 
 Since the establishment of the QMC property in the early twentieth century, locals 
have not been allowed to live within the Kaimosi Forest.  Due to the rapid population 
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increase, as well as the growth and establishment of the QMC lands, the average 
homestead size in the area is diminishing to an average of less than two acres leaving 
little room for the staple crops of beans and corn (Kassilly and Tsingalia 2009). The 
current shortage of land makes the Kaimosi Forest increasingly important for rainfall, the 
prevention of soil erosion, local resources, and cultural ceremonies in the area. However, 
recent research shows that the Kaimosi Forest is undergoing the highest rate of 
deforestation within the larger Kakamega Forest (Lung and Schaab 2006; Bleher, Uster, 
and Bergsdorf 2006). The CPR and CAPE literatures that guide this study are presented 
in Chapter 2 to explore the main factors influencing the role and perception of local 
institutions on deforestation in the Kaimosi Forest.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THEORECTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
A common pool natural resource is a type of resource that benefits a group of 
people, but which provides diminished benefits to everyone if each individual pursues 
their own self-interest in the collection or use of the resource.  The size or characteristics 
of the resource makes it costly to exclude users from obtaining benefits from its use.  
Thus the two defining characteristics are excludability (i.e. difficulty of controlling user 
access) and subtractability (i.e. each user is capable of subtracting from the welfare of 
other users) (Feeny 1986; Ostrom 1990). Examples include fisheries, wildlife, 
groundwater basins, rangeland, irrigation systems, and forests. Such resources represent 
an important component in the livelihoods of people throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America (NRC 1986; Ostrom 1990). Within the past century, utilization of common pool 
resources has increased due to factors such as population growth, climate change, and 
persistent poverty (Feeny 1986; Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000; Deitz et al. 2002).  
 For thousands of years, people dependent upon common pool resources have self-
organized to create institutionalized controls for sustainably using their resource base.  
. 
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Institutions in this context are the rules that govern the collective use of the resource 
(Deitz et al. 2002). Examples of institutions include forest-cutting controls in Nepal, 
wildlife utilization regulations in the Congo Basin, and indigenous fishing regulations in 
Asia (Feeny 1986) The purpose of institutions are to ensure effective use of the natural 
resource while maintaining long-term economic viability (Ostrom 1990). In some 
instances institutions have not been established or have been eradicated by circumstances 
such as armed conflict or colonization.  When institutions are not properly implemented, 
users have the incentive to exploit the common pool resource without concern for the 
negative long-term effects on other users (Ostrom et al. 1999).  This undesirable result of 
over-exploitation is referred to as the “commons dilemma.” 
 This chapter first reviews common property theory literature to explain and 
discuss the main theories surrounding the commons dilemma.  The first section presents 
four models that are influential in shaping how researchers traditionally view common 
pool resource management. The second section reviews significant variables identified in 
commons case studies associated with successful common property regimes (CPRs). By 
considering each variable, this study evaluates the role and perception of local institutions 
on deforestation and degradation in the Kaimosi Forest, Western Kenya. The last section 
will show how Cultural and Political Ecology are used to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of this complex people and forests relationship by focusing on the role of 
household decision-making and local power struggles.   
The Role of Models for Analyzing Common Pool Resources 
 The conventional Western solution for solving the commons dilemma is to 
enclose the common pool resource by individually privatizing the resource (Ostrom 
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1990). When institutions are not established, privatization of common pool resources can 
be the optimal solution for the commons dilemma.  However, many Western scholars 
have historically overlooked the role of institutions on successful resource management 
and suggested privatization based on the premise that rational individuals cannot 
mutually use the resource to ensure they reach optimal group benefits. The first three 
models represent this conventional theory: The Logic of Collective Action, The Tragedy 
of the Commons, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each model uses similar theoretical 
assumptions to formalize the commons dilemma under different circumstances to suggest 
privatization as the only solution (Ostrom 1998). One problem with this recommendation 
is that converting common property to an individual private property regime often fails to 
stop overuse, and in many cases may contribute to even more rapid over-use of resources 
(Runge 1986). In contrast, the fourth model, titled Common Property Regimes (CPRs), 
reevaluates the assumptions of the conventional models using empirical evidence.  This 
model offers an alternative solution that allows communities to have local authority over 
the use and management of their common pool resources and has led to the development 
of a new theoretical framework for analyzing common pool resource management (NRC 
1986; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 1998; McKean 2000).   
Model 1: The Logic of Collective Action 
 In “The Logic of Collective Action”, Olson (1965) challenges the presumption 
argued in game theory that individuals in a group of any size with a common interest will 
work together to achieve those interests (Truman 1958). Olson (1965) uses the example 
of unions in the United States to show that once an individual is a member of a large 
group and receives group benefits, it is hard to be excluded from receiving the group 
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benefits.  Once this occurs, individuals will have the incentive to “free ride” on the efforts 
of other members rather than contribute voluntarily to the provision of that good or 
service (Kimber 1981).  Therefore, collective action is unlikely to occur in large groups 
without using coercion to ensure all members contribute to the common interests. One 
potential solution offered to help solve this dilemma is having a small-sized group where 
each user’s contribution has a significant influence on the group’s effort to achieve 
collective benefits. The main argument taken from Olson’s work is that collective 
sustained benefits are not likely without the use of external coercion, monitoring, and 
enforcement (Ostrom 1990). Olson’s (1965) argument is one of three influential models 
that have been used by policy-makers and state governments to justify the enclosure of all 
common pool resources undergoing over use and degradation (Ostrom 1990). 
Model 2: The Tragedy of the Commons 
 In 1968, ecologist Hardin (1968) instituted a thesis that growing human 
populations will place increasing stress on finite natural resources, resulting in 
overexploitation and ruin (Burger and Gochfeld 1998).  Hardin uses Lloyd’s metaphor of 
herdsman sharing a common grazing field (Lloyd 1968).  Here, each herdsman receives 
personal gain by adding cattle to the field, while the cost (i.e. resource degradation) is 
placed on the entire group. Therefore, each herdsman rationally chooses to add more 
cattle to his herd without limit. “Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. 
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin 1968, 162).  Hardin termed this 
phenomenon the “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968).  One conclusion often 
drawn from Hardin’s metaphor of individual users over-grazing a pasture is the idea that 
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common pool resources are also open access resources, where no requirements are 
established for who is allowed to use the resource (Ostrom 1990; Dietz et al. 2002). The 
parable of a common grazing field can also be structured as the third collective choice 
model: the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Dawes 1973; Ostrom 1990). 
Model 3: The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game creates a paradox where an individual’s 
rational strategy leads to irrational group outcomes (Dawes 1973). Suppose the players in 
a game are two suspects being separately interrogated about a crime they jointly 
committed. The suspects are not allowed to communicate. Hence, if each “co-operates” 
and does not confess, both will likely receive a short prison sentence, but if each defects 
and confesses they will receive a medium sentence. However, if one suspect stays silent 
and the other confesses; the first will receive a long sentence while the confessor receives 
a much shorter sentence.  The PD game suggests that each suspect has a rationally ranked 
list of preferred options: (1) the other suspect stays silent, while they confess (2) both 
suspects stay silent (3) both suspects confess (4) one suspect stays silent while the other 
suspect confesses (Ostrom 1990; Deitz et al. 2002).  Since it is impossible to know what 
the other will decide, the rational choice is for each suspect to confess to ensure that they 
will not receive the worst outcome of a long sentence. This shows that pursuing 
individual benefits logically lead the prisoners to betray the other and defect (i.e. 
confess), even though they would both be better off if they cooperated (i.e. not-confess) 
(Wade 1987).  This paradox challenges the notion that rational human beings can achieve 
rational collective benefits (Ostrom 1990). Consequently, social scientists refer to this 
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paradox as the “commons dilemma” because of its relation to Hardin’s “Tragedy” 
metaphor (Godwin and Shepard 1979).  
Tragedy of the Commons Models and Resulting Policy Outcomes 
 
 Policy-makers, state-governments, and scholars have used these three 
conventional models to justify two standard policy recommendations; resources should 
be converted to private property or centralized governments should seize control of 
common pool resources (Ostrom 1990). For instance, Smith (1981) uses Hardin’s (1968) 
“open to all” perspective to justify the need for privatization of common resources 
(Hardin 1968, 1244). As Smith remarks; “Hardin’s treatment of the tragedy of the 
commons suggest that the only way to avoid the tragedy of the commons in natural 
resources and wildlife is to end the common property system by creating a system of 
private property rights” (1981, 467). Moreover, this view has led to a strategy called 
“fortress conservation” where human settlement and activity are removed from 
vulnerable environments undergoing severe degradation (Siurua 2006). These policy 
recommendations are often ineffective because the models use theoretical assumptions 
that do not necessarily apply to over-use issues related to common pool resources. These 
three models have all concluded that the commons dilemma exists because the 
individuals are stuck in a setting where they generate negative externalities toward one 
another, which in turn creates the free rider problem. The free rider problem is the 
expected result because all three models have analyzed simple common-pool resource 
systems and behavioral models that do not always apply to real world scenarios. A 
critique of these assumptions is provided before discussing the fourth model, Common 
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Property Regimes (CPRs), where common users self-organize to achieve close to optimal 
results when exploiting their resources (Ostrom 1990).  
Guiding Assumptions used in Conventional Commons Models 
 The conventional theory is based off the assumption that all common pool 
resources are open access; however with “common property,” resources are used and 
owned by a specific group of users (Ostrom 1990). When access is limited, the group is 
able to communicate and agree on how to best use their resource to ensure long term 
sustainability. Furthermore, the conventional theory assumes commons users do not 
communicate and are unrestrained by appropriation rules; these conditions fit 
unorganized, large groups of actors appropriating from an international commons, for 
instance (Ostrom 1998). However, most common pool resources are within a region or 
area where a small number of actors are better able to communicate, agree on their 
appropriation levels and sanctioning systems, and even find means to enforce these 
strategies themselves (Ostrom 1998; Dietz et al. 2002). The theoretical role of 
communication in non-cooperative game theory views words as “frail constraints” 
(Ostrom 1998, 427). Thus, the conventional theory has treated the ability to communicate 
as insignificant to change group behavior. Lastly, the conventional theory assumes that 
individuals can choose only once before the payoffs are received (Ostrom 1998). Yet, 
commons users are not prisoners. They can communicate and change their constraints 
over time to reach the optimal collective benefit.  
 The modified assumptions of commons users test the generalizability of the 
conventional model. Results show that in small, well specified environments where 
communication is possible, users are willing to pay the cost involved in creating, 
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monitoring, and enforcing proper resource use for overcoming the free-rider problem 
(Ostrom 1998; Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000). Therefore the conventional theory is 
not adequate for explaining behavior in such settings where users overcome the commons 
dilemma (Ostrom 1998). Consequently, an alternative model is needed.  
Model 4: Common Property Regimes  
 The fourth model for understanding and solving common pool resource issues 
was developed by Ostrom (1998) as the “Self-Governance of Common-Pool Resources,” 
now referred to as Common Property Regimes (CPRs). The role of CPRs is to 
implement, monitor, and enforce local rules or institutions for using the resource. In a 
CPR arrangement, a particular set of people share the rights to a resource. Therefore, 
contrary to open access or public property, CPRs should be considered shared private 
property whereby a specific set of people have access to use the commons resource while 
abiding by the local institutions, or rules in use (Wade 1987; Gibson, McKean, and 
Ostrom 2000; Ostrom 2005). Without the role of institutions, the free rider problem 
suggests that individual privatization is the favorable solution to properly conserve and 
sustain natural resources (Dietz et al. 2002). On the contrary, CPRs use institutions to 
control resource use creating a managed commons, which is distinct from Hardin’s 
(1968) free for all idea of the commons. CPRs have created sustainable human-
environment relationships for thousands of years and therefore should be thought of as a 
positive alternative to individually owned private property (Ostrom 1990).    
 Unlike individually owned private property, members of a CPR receive benefits 
and rights to use and govern their resources (Ostrom 1990).  In the “Drama of the 
Commons,” Dietz et al. (2002) argue that CPRs perform better than private property 
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when the economic output of the resource is slow, the resource is spatially spread out, 
and the cost of enforcing private property rights is high. Individual privatization removes 
the chance for commons users to receive long-term benefits from the resource (Rocheleau 
and Edmunds 1997; Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000).  Therefore, the rational choice 
of privatization is to start pursuing maximum-harvesting strategies for economic returns 
rather than the traditional sustainable harvesting strategies (Ostrom and Nagendra 2006).  
For example, Agrawal (2000) shows in his case study on forest management in India, 
whenever privatization has occurred, it has damaged the complex ecology by fragmenting 
the land, caused locals to exacerbate deforestation and land degradation because of lost 
ownership, and led to lack of stewardship. Another issue with private property is that 
analysts rarely discuss how to establish private rights for common pool resources.  Private 
property rights cannot be easily established with non-stationary resources such as water 
and fisheries (Clark 1980; Ostrom 1990).  In addition, privatization solutions suggest 
parceling land-based resources into sections, which can disturb natural spatial patterns 
within the ecosystem and therefore increase resource degradation (Gibson, McKean, and 
Ostrom 2000).  
CPRs offer an alternative solution that can prevent the negative social and 
environmental effects of privatization and maintain a balance between resource 
exploitation and conservation; however, local institutions must be properly established 
and governed in order to reach this balance. The following section discusses the 
development of a framework for analyzing local institutions associated with common 
pool resources.    
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Developing a Common Property Framework for People and Forests 
During the mid-1980s researchers began synthesizing their empirical-based 
transnational common property research to develop a new analytical framework 
consisting of the optimal institutional arrangements for different types of CPRs.  In 1985, 
the National Academy of Sciences’ “Panel on Common Property Resource Management” 
was a major step in the development of a broader theory of institutional arrangements 
related to successful CPRs (Ostrom 1990). The most significant aspect of this particular 
research panel was commissioning multiple field researchers to write papers using the 
same analytical framework developed by Oakerson (1986). Although there had been 
hundreds of common property case studies published before this time, there had never 
been syntheses between multiple researchers at this scale (Dietz et al. 2002). A synthesis 
at this scale was necessary because of the different variations of CPRs, which depends on 
the type of resource, number of users, and the type of institutions in place (Ostrom 1990). 
The new comprehensive theory attempts to explain whether and under what conditions 
sustainable resource management will occur, rather than simply predicting the demise of 
all resources held in common (NRC 1986). Since variations in the type of natural 
resource affect the type of institutions required for successful conservation, the commons 
framework presented in the next section is designed for analyzing common property 
forests with the intentions of creating a sustainable (win-win) people and forests 
relationship.   
 Researchers argue that recognizing the role and appropriateness of local 
institutions is crucial for understanding a CPRs influence on deforestation (Ostrom 1990; 
Oakerson 1992; McKean 2000; Dietz et al. 2002).  For a CPR to be successful, several 
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attributes regarding local institutions are necessary (see Ostrom 1990; Gibson, McKean, 
and Ostrom 2000). Although other frameworks include differing institutional attributes, 
the specific attributes included in this analysis are replicated from Vadjunec’s (2010) 
research in the Chico Mendes Extractive Reserve, Acre, Brazil (see also McKean 2000). 
These include perceived fairness with rule enforcement and punishment for rule breaking, 
user participation in the rule making, clearly defined boundary lines, clearly defined 
membership requirements, monitoring forest-use, shared vision among users, and 
saliency (dependency on the resource). 
Enforcement and Punishment of Local Institutions (Forest-Use Rules) 
The appropriate level of enforcement is vital to the success of a CPR (McKean 
2000). For example, Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe (2000) compare different levels of 
enforcement in five Ugandan forests and conclude that the best forest conditions exist 
when the level of enforcement is well understood and perceived as fair by the local forest 
users.  Rules must also be designed in a way that allows local guards to easily enforce the 
rules (McKean 2000).  A quantifiable rule concerning how much a resource may be 
exploited can be difficult to measure; such as how many kilograms of medicinal plant are 
being extracted. One possible solution is to design a rule that restricts the use of different 
types of equipment in the common property area (e.g. no machetes allowed within the 
forest boundary) or limit collection by seasons (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000). 
Punishment for rule breakers must be perceived as fair in order to increase the probability 
of users abiding by the rules (Ostrom 2005). A common suggestion to make forest rules 
perceived as fair is to make fines for first offenses low and increase with each subsequent 
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offense (Ostrom 1990; McKean 1992). Community participation in determining the 
punishment’s severity is also suggested for optimal results (McKean 2000).   
User Participation in the Rule Making 
Members should be able to give input into rule making and the governing process 
(Ostrom 1990; Oakerson 1992; McKean 2000).  When user input is allowed, it is more 
likely that the rules will be perceived as fair.  In addition, when locals are involved in the 
decisions regarding forest-use rules, they are more likely to help monitor others more so 
than when an authority (e.g. forest guard) solely enforces the rules (Ostrom and Nagendra 
2006).  
Boundary Lines 
Resource users should have a clear definition of forest boundary lines (Gibson, 
McKean, and Ostrom. 2000).  Clearly defined and demarcated boundary lines allow the 
caretakers to effectively guard the resource from outside invaders, helping sustain a 
shared private property.  Clearly defined boundary lines also prevent the resource from 
being divided into parcels, which makes it more cost effective to guard the resource and 
allows the resource to remain productive (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000).  
Privatizers often suggest dividing forest ecosystems into environmentally inappropriate 
parcels, which has led to much undesirable deforestation and land degradation throughout 
the world (Ostrom 1990; McKean 2000). Moreover, preventing division is especially 
important with forest ecosystems because fragmentation may disrupt the essential spatial 
dimensions required for forest species to interact (McKean 2000).   
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Membership 
CPRs consist of a defined number of users who are allowed to use the common 
pool resources (McKean 2000). Specific requirements for membership are essential for 
CPRs because it makes the resource private instead of public and prevents outsiders from 
exploiting the resource (Oakerson 1992). The requirements for membership must be well 
defined in order to prevent the resource from becoming open access, and thus creating a 
commons dilemma.   
Monitoring Forest-Use 
Monitoring levels of extraction is important for long-term sustainability of forest 
resources (McKean 2000; Ostrom and Nagendra 2006). Ostrom and Nagendra (2006) 
argue that monitoring ecological systems helps understand the past and present 
conditions of the resource, make future predictions, and form a consensus between the 
residents and authorities on the optimal institutional arrangement for resource 
sustainability.   
Shared Vision  
Social capital is defined as a “resource of reciprocity and trust which can be 
drawn upon by households in the composition of sustainable livelihoods” (Cleaver 2001, 
28). Social capital variables such as having a shared vision among users is seen as 
necessary for ensuring effective collective action towards managing common pool 
resources (Ostrom 1990; Narayan 1997). Research shows that users should have a shared 
vision of the forest and awareness of the consequences of their actions towards the 
environment and community (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000).  A shared vision is 
created when the perceived allocation of resources provides an equal amount of benefit to 
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all members (Dietz et al. 2002).  In “Making the Commons Work,” Oakerson (1992) 
defines this attribute as “jointness,” where one person’s use does not subtract from the 
use of other members (pg. 43).  A shared vision and perceived equal allocation of 
resources is essential for CPRs to successfully operate because it increases the chance of 
reciprocity between users (Rawes 1971; Ostrom 1990; Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 
2000). Community cohesion, however, is not always influential enough on its own to 
achieve successful collective action (Ostrom 1990). For instance, Gibson and Koontz 
(1998) find in their case study on two CPRs in Southern Indiana, shared values within the 
community does not necessarily translate into successful outcomes. Therefore, 
institutions should be established to translate the community’s values into rules that 
members follow.   
Saliency 
 One important requirement for successful resource management is saliency 
(Ostrom 1990; McKean 2000).  Saliency occurs when an individual is directly dependent 
on the resource for their livelihood (Turner, Gibson, and Dodds 2007).  Saliency ensures 
that all members have a direct interest in the sustainability of the resource and will 
therefore act in favor of long-term conservation (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000). 
Although Hardin’s (1968) metaphor does not distinguish between common resources 
where the users are salient or not, Kimber (1983) considers Hardin’s logic to be most 
likely true when users are not directly dependent on the resource for survival. Following 
this logic, Wade (1987) states that when survival is at stake, the “rational” commons 
users must restrain from resource exploitation at some point. Furthermore, Vadjunec 
(2010) finds that saliency can contribute to creating community cohesion by forming a 
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singular identity among commons users.  Turner and colleagues (2007) argue that 
saliency and a perceived scarcity of the resource are both equally important requirements 
for having a successful CPR with restrictive rules concerning resource use.     
 Empirical evidence shows that when institutional attributes are properly 
implemented, CPRs can create a socially and environmentally just balance that can be 
highly sustainable (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000; Vadjunec 2010).  CPRs also 
provide people with access to valuable resources instead of merely restricting them; as a 
result, they can increase the quality of livelihoods for a larger group of people.  This 
study uses the CPR framework (described above) to explore the main factors influencing 
the role and perception of local institutions on deforestation in the Kaimosi Forest.  As 
noted by Gibson and Becker (2000), each CPR is unique in regards to social, 
environmental, and institutional factors and what works for one CPR, may not work in 
another. 
Cultural and Political Ecology  
 Cultural and Political Ecology (CAPE) offers an additional and valuable approach 
for understanding the role and perception of institutions on deforestation and degradation 
in the Kaimosi Forest. CAPE broadens the focus to include the role of individual actors in 
commons resource management by focusing on the role of household decision-making 
(i.e. Cultural Ecology) and local power struggles (i.e. Political Ecology). The specific 
CAPE approaches used in this study will be discussed before explaining how they 
enhance the CPR framework presented above.   
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Cultural Ecology 
 The study of cultural ecology (CE) emerged in anthropology and geography with 
a broad focus on the relationship between culture and the environment, often focusing on 
cultural adaptation to local ecologies and environmental change (Steward 1955; Sutton 
and Anderson 2010). The interdisciplinary nature of CE enables a synthesis between 
theories and approaches from different specialized subfields and is therefore the most 
appropriate field to inform human-environment policy (Sutton and Anderson 2010).  CE 
research evaluates the social and environmental effects of policy change and helps predict 
future outcomes concerning a wide range of applied issues. This research has yielded 
insight for policy reform on issues such as alleviation of water shortages in Africa 
(White, Bradley, and White 1972), adaptation to drought (Westcoat 1991), and local 
knowledge-based farming practices (Doolittle 1984; Netting 1993).   
 CE generally addresses issues on the micro-spatial scale (i.e. household level) in 
non-western settings and typically involves extensive field research. Moreover, CE 
studies often focus on a particular social group (e.g. peasant or native) for an extended 
period of time in the field. Much CE research focuses on local-level settings (i.e. village 
or household) in order to best understand resource-use behaviors. This research design 
has proven very helpful in understanding people-forest interactions in the humid tropics. 
According to Zimmerer (2004, 795), CE’s most important contribution is the capacity to 
focus the “research design on selective combination of the key socio-economic and 
environmental dimensions that are embodied in the diverse logics and decision-making of 
forest-using households.” Analyzing intra-household adaptation and decision-making 
allows the researcher to understand the choices and consequences of such choices (e.g. 
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farming practices and forest plant extraction) on natural resource management. These 
choices engender important livelihood and environmental consequences that must be 
understood before interpreting the impact of local policies and institutions (Smit and 
Wandel 2006).  Although CE perspectives cover a wide range of human-environment 
aspects, this study focuses on household decision-making in regards to land-use and 
forest-use. A few early CE studies recognized the effects of power and political economy 
in the lives of rural people, which eventually led to a new approach called Political 
Ecology (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). 
Political Ecology  
 In the mid-1980s, geographers Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) popularized the 
term Political Ecology (PE) by combining “the concerns of ecology and a broadly 
defined political economy”(pg. 17). Representing an explicit alternative to “apolitical” 
ecology, PE contextually approaches issues by “identifying the broader systems rather 
than blaming proximate and local forces”, and “viewing ecological systems as power-
laden rather than politically inert” (Robbins 2004, 5). Political ecologists query the 
relationship between livelihood, politics, and nature (Robbins 2004). PE studies that 
include multiple scales (micro, macro) of analysis offer a broadened dimension of 
human-environment interactions by showing the inter-connectedness and influence of 
political and economic forces. Topical issues include land degradation, deforestation, 
desertification, conservation, institutions and governance, ecological impacts of 
economic development, and equality and environmental trade-offs (Turner and Robbins 
2008).   
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 The main premise behind PE research is that environmental change and 
ecological degradation are the product of political processes and unequal power dynamics 
(Robbins 2004). This premise is formed by three connected assumptions: (1) “the costs 
and benefits associated with environmental change are for the most part distributed 
among actors unequally,” (2) this unequal distribution of environmental costs “reinforces 
existing social and economic inequalities” and, in turn, (3) “also has political implications 
in terms of the altered power of actors in relation to other actors” (Bryant and Bailey 
1997, 28-29).  
 The types of actors involved in environmental change and conflict in developing 
countries include states, multilateral institutions, businesses, environmental NGOs and 
grassroots actors (e.g. poor farmers, shifting cultivators, and pastoralists). Political 
ecologists view the concept of power  “in relation to the ability of an actor to control their 
own interaction with the environment and the interaction of other actors with the 
environment” (Bryant and Bailey 1997, 39). PE research tends to reveal that 
environmental change signifies winners and losers (i.e. wealth creation for some and 
impoverishment for others), and reveals the differential power and conflict that produces 
social and environmental outcomes (Robbins 2004). Power struggles and conflict among 
actors lead to degradation of natural resources that often have the most detrimental 
impact on marginalized and powerless groups.   
Employing Common Property Theory and CAPE as Complementary Approaches  
 The institutional variables presented in the previous section have been applied to 
numerous commons case studies and have proven reliable for analyzing local institutions; 
however, the framework does not explicitly account for the effects of political forces on 
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livelihoods and conflict between individual actors within CPRs (Dietz et al. 2002). 
Robbins (2004) argues, although common property theory is “one of the first and most 
essential contributions to a contemporary political ecology…practical action is limited to 
internal ‘rule crafting’ ” (pg. 43-45).  He is suggesting that a more adequate theory should 
comprise of multiple scales of power and diverse players acting within the commons 
(Robbins 2004). Therefore, environmental issues cannot be understood in isolation from 
the political and livelihood context within which CPR they are created (Bryant and 
Bailey 1997; Robbins 2004). 
 Furthermore, the CPR framework described above is typically applied at the 
community level using rapid assessment techniques (IFRI 2007). CE provides a 
complementary approach for highlighting the complexities within communities by 
focusing on the household level to best understand local resource-use behaviors. In 
addition, CE approaches are essential for understanding temporal dimensions of CPRs 
such as the role of household decision-making and adaptation techniques.  Taken 
together, CAPE highlights the role of household decision-making and adaptation while 
also including the role of power struggles and conflict among players acting within the 
commons. Overall, the community scale approach of CPR studies combined with the 
micro and macro scale approaches of CAPE add robustness to this analysis. Here, CAPE 
approaches broaden the focus beyond traditional CPR case studies in order to produce a 
comprehensive interpretation of the environmental issues facing this people and forests 
relationship.  	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Conclusion 
 This chapter began with an outline of three conventional models that were used to 
form a theory of environmental degradation of common pool resources. According to the 
models’ assumptions, the inevitable result was failure and degradation whereby rational 
individuals seek personal benefit while placing the cost on the group (i.e. the free rider 
problem). The fourth model presented empirical evidence collected from commons 
researchers which concluded that if conditions allow for community negotiation, iterative 
observation of outcomes, and proper structure of institutions, environmental degradation 
is not the inevitable result of collectivity (Ostrom 1990; Dietz et al. 2002; Robbins 2004). 
Researchers then began to focus on the role of local institutions for understanding a CPRs 
influence on resource management. Moreover, this focus led to the identification of 
significant attributes associated with successful CPRs (Ostrom 1990; McKean 2000; 
Dietz et al. 2002).  
 CAPE approaches offer a human-environment perspective that can complement 
other existing frameworks, such as common property theory, by expanding the 
understanding of environmental change in the context of an integrated understanding of 
human-environmental interactions (Bryant and Bailey 1997). CE approaches help 
highlight the role of the household, while PE highlights environmental degradation as a 
result of power struggles and conflict. CAPE complements the CPR research design by 
enabling the analysis to explore the relationship between household patterns, local actors, 
and the CPR institutional dimensions. As the methods chapter will show, the data 
collection techniques were designed to integrate all three approaches.  Therefore, this 
study seeks to better understand the role of (1) significant attributes for successful CPRs, 
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(2) household decisions regarding land-use and natural resource use, and (3) local power 
struggles among individual actors. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
A mixed methods approach was used in this study to best interpret the role and 
perception of local institutions on deforestation and degradation in the Kaimosi Forest, 
Western Kenya. Traditionally, human-environment research that explores institutional 
dimensions of CPRs typically focuses on the community level (Ostrom 1990, Robbins 
2004).  With the addition of a CAPE lens, this research analysis is broadened to include 
household differences in land-use, livelihood, and forest-use within two villages 
surrounding the Kaimosi Forest. Household surveys and key-informant interviews were 
conducted within two villages in order to explore relationships between people and forest 
dynamics.  The types of variables collected in this study are replicated from Vadjunec’s 
(2010) framework for analyzing a CPR in Acre, Brazil. Before explaining the 
methodologies, it is necessary to discuss the research questions that form the basis of this 
study: 
1) What are the major socio-economic and demographic factors that influence 
household land-use decisions and forest extraction?   
 
2) How are local forest institutions created, implemented, monitored, and 
enforced in the Kaimosi Forest?    
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3) How do local perceptions among households and other actors differ regarding 
the institutions currently operating in the Kaimosi Forest? 3b) How do these 
differences impact forest-use and local livelihoods?  
Answers to these questions will help explain how the relationship between people 
and forests impacts livelihoods and deforestation and degradation in the Kaimosi Forest.  
More specifically, by focusing on the role and perception of local institutions and land-
use, I seek to gain insight into the main social and institutional factors that influence 
deforestation and degradation. Below are the various components of the research 
methodologies (Table 1). 
Table 1. Research Components: Primary Data Collection and Exploratory Data Analysis 
Questions Methodologies Summary of Intentions 
 Research Permit 
and Field Assistants 
Received full approval of research from Kenyan 
Government and hired two field assistants.  
 
 
1, 2 and 3 
 
Participant 
Observation 
Gained local knowledge regarding local land-
uses, forest-extraction types, and cultural 
practices associated with the surrounding forest.  
 
 
 
2 and 3 
 
 
Key-informant 
Interviews (n=12) 
(a) Received information regarding local 
institutions and land-use. (b) Determined two 
opposing villages undergoing the least and most 
deforestation and degradation. 
 
 
1, 2 and 3 
 
Household 
Surveys (n= 64) 
Collected data regarding socio-economic 
(livelihood), demographic, land-use, forest-use, 
and the role and perception of institutions.   
 
 
 
1 and 3b 
 
 
 
Statistical and 
Qualitative Synthesis 
(a) Explored the relationship between household 
demographics, land-use livelihoods, and forest-
use. (b) Interpreted the role of local institutions 
on deforestation and degradation in the Kaimosi 
Forest.  
 
 The mixed methods approach used in this study is presented in two stages 
consisting of primary data collection and exploratory data analysis.  The first section 
explains the data collection carried out over a ten-week period from June to August 2011. 
The field methods consist of participant-observation, key-informant interviews (n=12), 
and household surveys (n=68). Since this study involves human subjects living near the 
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Kaimosi Forest, approval was first obtained from the Institutional Review Board in May 
2011 (see Appendix A). The next section includes the steps for constructing the database 
and indices as well as the statistics used in exploring the quantitative primary data.  The 
qualitative data collected from field notes and open-ended survey questions will assist in 
contextualizing and interpreting the quantitative results. The last section shows how these 
methods are designed and triangulated to produce a comprehensive interpretation of the 
environmental issues facing the Kaimosi Forest and local residents.  
Stage 1: Fieldwork in the Kaimosi Forest, Western Kenya 
Research Permit, Field Assistants, and Consideration of Human Subjects 
 Before the fieldwork began, the research permit was acquired from the National 
Research Council of Science and Technology headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya (see 
Appendix B). In order to meet the requirements of the permit, an affiliation was 
established with Masinde Muliro University in Kakamega, Kenya. After receiving the 
permit, two research assistants were hired to assist in the completion of the household 
surveys.  The assistants were undergraduate students at Moi University in Eldoret, 
Kenya. Prior to starting any fieldwork, a day was set aside to train the assistants about the 
purpose and intentions of the field techniques. The research assistants were fluent in 
English, Kiswahili (i.e. the national language of Kenya), and Luyia (i.e. the local regional 
language). Having trilingual field assistants allowed for the data collection to be 
completed without language barriers.  
 Working with human subjects in a different culture required an extra focus on 
preventing ethical dilemmas.  The assistants were trained to describe to the participants 
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the ethical considerations that were taken to protect human subjects in this study. To 
ensure that minimal risks were placed upon the participants, full confidentially and/or 
anonymity was required. It was clearly explained that names would not be recorded and 
their responses would be kept safe throughout the research process. Before the survey or 
interview began, participants were told that they did not have to answer any questions 
they felt were inappropriate and could stop at any time. The first two weeks of 
participant-observation techniques ensured that cultural norms were understood before 
conducting any formal interviews or surveys. The next section discusses how the 
participant-observation techniques were used in the field. 
Participant-Observation 
 Participant-observation is a method in which a field researcher takes part in daily 
activities, rituals, and interactions of a group of people as a means of learning the aspects 
of their everyday lives and culture (Dewalt and Dewalt 2011). There are not necessarily 
formal steps to follow when using this method; however, there are common suggestions 
to ensure the technique is completed in an ethical and productive manner. For instance, it 
is equally important to focus on participating (learning through experience) as well as 
observing (learning by seeing) (Laurier 2003).  Participant-observation can help view 
certain types of social and environmental phenomena that are often too complex for 
methodologies used for detecting general trends. It allows the researcher to obtain a 
degree of the particular know-how of activities, appropriate conduct, and common 
knowledge of the place and people (Livingston 1987; Dewalt and Dewalt 2011). In 
addition, participant-observation complements other methodologies by allowing the 
researcher to build a bottom-up qualitative description of an area.  
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 The first two weeks out of ten total weeks in the field consisted exclusively of 
participant-observation. Prior to conducting any other forms of research, it was essential 
to build the necessary social capital by creating a partnership with local actors. My 
intentions were to establish my presence as a researcher and a temporary member of the 
community. As an outsider, participating in local activities such as collecting forest 
plants, harvesting crops, and attending church helped create a relationship with locals to 
ensure that my presence in the village was understood (Laurier 2003).  More specifically, 
it was an opportunity to better understand local household land-uses as well as the types 
of NTFPs extracted, species collected, and cultural practices associated with the 
surrounding forest. Participating in these activities also allowed locals to ask me 
questions pertaining to my intentions as a student and a researcher.  
 Participating in such activities as harvesting crops and collecting medicinal forest 
plants allowed the field note commentary to include why decisions were made and how 
tasks were completed. Laurier (2003) notes that an important aspect of transcribing 
observations is when and where the notes are taken. Therefore, consideration was taken 
in sensitive settings and field notes were often transcribed after the activity was 
completed. The field note commentary is drawn from to triangulate the qualitative and 
quantitative data during the discussion of the results in chapter 5. The next section 
explains the design and completion of the key-informant interviews.  
Key-Informant Interviews 
On June 6th, 2011 Masinde Muliro University hosted the International Conference on 
Tropical Forest Resources. This provided an excellent opportunity to enhance my 
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knowledge regarding the environmental issues facing the Kakamega Forest and interview 
scholars having expertise in the field of study and region. Starting during the third week, 
12 key-informant semi-structured interviews were conducted with local actors including, 
chiefs, education officials, Quaker Mission Church leaders, and Kenyan Forest Service 
officials. Each interview took approximately one hour to complete. I was present during 
all the interviews along with one research assistant. All of the key-informants spoke 
English, which allowed me to lead all of the interviews.  A geographically stratified 
snowballing technique was used as the sampling method to capture major actors relevant 
to the management of the Kaimosi Forest. This method was determined to be the best 
technique to obtain the target number of interviews from a wide range of informants. 
Both fixed and open-ended questions were used in the interviews. The questions focused 
on the following types of information (see Appendix D for Key-Informant Interviews):  
• Major environmental issues in the Kaimosi Forest (e.g. deforestation, degradation, 
water, soil, over-use of forest resources) and major land-use/land-tenure issues 
• Community conflicts regarding: selling property, hunting, timber extraction, 
NGOs, forest-use rules, water, and soil erosion  
• Main institutions responsible for monitoring, enforcing, and punishing forest-use 
rules, level of local participation in rule making, and issues with rule-breaking   
• Perceptions regarding the village with the least and most amount of 
environmental issues (deforestation and degradation) and the least and most 
organized village surrounding the Kaimosi Forest      
 The key-informant sampling started with the highest-ranking government official 
in the region and continued outward to more localized chiefs, church leaders, and Kenyan 
Forest Service officials. The snowballing technique was used by asking each key-
informant for additional contacts to high-ranking leaders in the area. Two objectives were 
completed during the 12 semi-structured interviews. The first objective was to gain 
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insight on, land-use, forest-use, local institutions, and environmental pressures in the 
Kaimosi Forest and surrounding areas. The second objective was to determine the 
official’s perception regarding villages undergoing the least and most deforestation and 
degradation pertaining to CPR management of the Kaimosi Forest. This information was 
used to determine two villages (i.e. sampling frames) for the household surveys.  The 
perceived least and most successful villages in terms of commons natural resource 
management were selected to carry out a quantitative comparison of the two villages in 
regards to household demographics, land-use, livelihood, forest-use, and perception of 
institutional dimensions. Due to time constraints, the household surveys began directly 
after the two villages had been selected.   
Household Surveys 
The household interviews were designed to have clear and effective questions to 
ensure non-bias and relevant data collection (Longhurst 2003). The CPR framework and 
CAPE perspectives presented in Chapter 2 theoretically guided the design of the surveys. 
Fixed and open-ended questions were used to acquire the proper data types. Fixed 
questions were used to collect demographic/household characteristics and land-
use/forest-use patterns. These questions provided responses that could be quantified and 
explored with inferential statistics to reveal significant trends. Fixed responses also 
included the Likert scale to show the range of differing perceptions and opinions among 
participants. For instance, ordinal responses such as “(1) disagree strongly, (2) disagree 
somewhat, (3) agree in general, or (4) agree strongly” provided quantifiable fixed data. 
The open-ended questions offered detailed insights regarding differences in local 
decision-making, perceptions, opinions, and experiences. These questions allowed 
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participants to craft their own responses in order to best represent their true viewpoints. 
Thus, the qualitative data gathered from these open-ended questions supplemented the 
quantitative data with contextual understandings of the local circumstances.  Since it is 
essential that questions be simple, clear, and easy to understand; a pre-test was conducted 
in the field to reveal flaws in the survey design.  
 Information collected from the key-informant interviews were used to select two 
villages for a stratified comparison household demographics, land-use, livelihood, forest-
use, and perception of institutional dimensions. Once the villages were selected, 34 
household surveys were conducted in each village (n = 68).  A sample size of at least 30 
surveys per village was necessary to reach a balance between time constraints, while at 
the same time satisfying the minimal requirements needed for the inferential statistical 
analysis.  Random sampling was used within the two villages to allow for the best 
representation of the two villages. Each household survey took approximately one hour to 
complete.  Most surveys were conducted in the late morning or midafternoon when 
residents were most likely to be home.  Out of courtesy, surveys were not conducted on 
weekends.  
 Preferably the male and female head of household, or, minimally the self-
identified head of household was interviewed.  It was a common occurrence to walk with 
the homeowner to see their livestock and farm while the survey was completed. The 
participants were told that they did not have to answer any questions they deemed 
sensitive or inappropriate. Furthermore, my intentions as a student and researcher were 
fully explained before questions were asked.  Oral consent was required from all 
participants before any questions were asked (see Appendix E). Although I was always 
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present during the surveys, the variation among participants regarding English-speaking 
skills determined how involved I was in asking the questions. Some household surveys 
were completed entirely in Luyia and Kiswahili. I understood enough Kiswahili for 
casual conversions and translating simple information (e.g. numbers or animal types); 
however, to aid in the execution of the survey, my field assistants often charged with 
asking the majority of survey questions in Kiswahili. A brief meeting was held after 
completing each survey to validate that all translations were transcribed accurately.  The 
questions explored the following types of information (See Appendix E for household 
surveys): 
• Socio-economic and demographic data (age, gender, education level, number 
of years of residency, and number of children)    
• Land-use and livelihood data (type of crops, animals, garden plants, 
dependency on the forest, non-timber forest products (NTFPs), household 
assets, mode of transportation, and distance to market) 
• Perceptions regarding institutions, resource management, resource scarcity, 
and environmental awareness 
The next section explains how the field data were organized and explored after returning 
from the field.  
Stage 2: Data Set Variables and Statistical Methods 
Independent Variables 
 This section provides the specific questions and descriptive statistical methods 
used in exploring the independent variables. The categories are guided by the CPR and 
CAPE literatures and more specifically Vadjunec’s (2010) analytical framework (see also 
Ostrom 1990; Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000). The village means are compared in 
order to explore differences in household demographics, land-use, livelihood, forest-use 
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and perception of institutional dimensions.  The household survey cross-sectional data set 
consists of the following categories: household demographics, land-use, forest-use, and 
institutional dimensions.   
Demographic Variables 
 The first category consists of basic household demographic data such as total 
number of residents, total number of females and males, and length of residency. In 
addition, these data were included in the statistical analysis (i.e. correlations) to explore 
trends in demographic attributes (e.g. family size and number of males per household) 
with land-use patterns such as amount of crop production and animal husbandry.  
Land-Use Variables 
 One of the main intentions of this study is to explore the relationship between 
land-use types and the perception of local institutions for using forest resources. 
Consequently, extensive land-use data were collected during the household surveys.  
Variables include property size (acres), type and quantity of crop production, and type 
and quantity of domesticated animals. Land-use patterns were gleaned to better 
understand how socio-economic and demographic factors affected land-use decision 
within villages surrounding the forest.  The results chapter will discuss significant 
correlations regarding the relationship between household demographics, land-use, 
livelihood, and forest-use patterns.  
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Livelihood Variables 
 Livelihood variables were collected with the intentions of creating a livelihood 
index for each household surveyed. The livelihood index measures the level of financial 
well-being of the household. Income levels for each household are difficult to acquire due 
to the high levels informal economic transactions within the communities. Therefore, the 
livelihood index was used to represent the income level of each household (Lindenberg 
2002). Replicating from Vadjunec (2010), household assets and housing type were 
identified as the best indicators of livelihood in the region. The index was created by 
assigning points for certain types of significant household assets: TV, icebox, sofa, table, 
stove, electric, motorbike, car, and type of house structure: roof type, house type, fence, 
water source type. From these 12 variables, a livelihood index was created to measure 
household wealth and economic well-being.  
Forest-Use Variables 
 The variables for analyzing local forest-use include frequency of collecting 
medicinal forest plants, domesticating forest plants, collecting deadwood, and purchasing 
deadwood from the market. Following the framework presented in Chapter 2, a measure 
of household forest saliency was designed.  The saliency index measures the level of 
forest extraction (i.e. forest dependency) for each household surveyed. Plant-use and 
deadwood collection were identified as the ideal measurement of forest dependency 
because they account for the most common types of forest extraction. The ten most 
commonly used plants by local residents were identified during key-informant interviews 
and household surveys. Deadwood collection was characterized by frequency of 
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collection (i.e. daily, weekly, or monthly). Medicinal plant collection was measured by 
frequency of collection in the past year. Overall, the variables used represent the most 
common type of human use in the Kaimosi Forest.  Therefore, the indicators used in this 
index provide a base measurement of forest saliency at the household level.   
Role and Perception of Local Institutions 
 The household surveys contained a section with questions that acquired 
information regarding the individual’s knowledge and experience with local institutions 
(i.e. the specific rules for using the Kaimosi Forest resources). Participants were asked 
whether they knew the rule, if they felt it was being properly monitored, and if they had 
heard of the rule being broken. In addition, participants were asked their range of 
agreement with each rule (see Appendix E for survey). This approach was useful for 
understanding the local perception and impacts of the forest-use rules currently operating 
within the Kaimosi Forest.   
 The second group of institutional variables consisted of the selected attributes 
identified as significant to successful CPRs (Ostrom 1990; Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 
2000; Vadjunec 2010). Participants were asked if they had a clear understanding of the 
forest boundaries, if they had issues with outsiders invading the boundaries, if they 
thought the rules were being monitored, if there was a defined membership for using the 
Kaimosi Forest, if they had any involvement in the rule making process, and the level of 
unity they felt existed within the their community. The data obtained from these 
questions allowed the analysis to provide insight regarding the role of various 
institutional dimensions within both communities surrounding the Kaimosi Forest.  
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Statistical Methods 
 The quantitative household data were explored with statistical techniques in order 
to determine significant similarities and differences in two villages (i.e. Village A and B) 
surrounding the Kaimosi Forest. The comparative analysis is based on Village A 
undergoing high levels and Village B undergoing low levels of deforestation and 
degradation.  Each question in the household survey represented an independent variable.  
Accordingly, a codebook was created to define the relationship between the question and 
abbreviated variable name used in Microsoft Excel.  The household survey data were 
then organized into a cross-sectional data set using Microsoft Excel. Lastly, the data set 
was transferred to the program SPSS in order to calculate the statistics.  
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Analyzing the Household Survey Data (n=68) 
Questions Methodologies Intentions 
 
 
2, 3 & 3b 
 
Two-means sample t-test 
of household survey data 
Explored differences and 
similarities between two villages 
for all household variables 
 
 
1, 3 & 3b 
Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient of household 
survey data 
Measured strength of the linear 
relationship between household 
variables 
 
 The first step was analyzing histograms and normal Q-Q plots to visually explore 
the distribution, variance, and normality of each variable. Next, the mean and standard 
deviation for all the household variables were calculated for Village A (n= 34) and 
Village B (n =34).  An independent samples t-test was used to determine which variables 
had a significant difference in equality at the 90% confidence level (Table 2). These 
calculations focused on the household-level to determined significant differences in 
village means. The next statistic calculated was the Pearson’s product-moment 
correlations coefficient, which measured the direction and strength of the linear 
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relationship between two variables (Table 2). For this calculation, both village samples 
were combined to explore the relationships between variables for the entire population 
surveyed.  
 Using both the independent samples t-test and the Person’s correlation allowed 
the analysis to show significant (and non-significant) similarities and differences between 
the two villages in regards to household demographics, land-use, livelihood, forest-use, 
and the perception of the institutional dimensions. Variables that had a non-significant p-
value also added to the results by showing similarities between villages.  
Quantitative and Qualitative Synthesis 
 Qualitative data collected from participant-observation activities, key-informant 
interviews, household surveys, and field notes is used to further interpret and 
contextualize the quantitative results. The intentions of Chapter 4 are to first present and 
explain the statistical results and then triangulate the results with the supplementary 
qualitative findings.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has described the data collection, dataset organization, and statistical 
methodologies employed in this study. A mixed methods approach was used to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the role of institutions on deforestation and degradation 
in the two selected villages surrounding the Kaimosi Forest. The methodologies were 
designed to collect data that corresponded with both CPR and CAPE perspectives. These 
perspectives guide the quantitative analysis of differences in household demographics, 
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land-use, livelihood, forest-use, and perception of institutional dimensions. The 
qualitative discussion will help interpret the quantitative results.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
 
This chapter draws from quantitative and qualitative data to explore the statistical 
results discovered in the household dataset as well as provide a discussion of the results. 
The first section explores differences in demographics, land-use, livelihood, and forest-
use in the two selected villages surrounding the Kaimosi Forest. Authorities perceive 
village A as undergoing higher rates of deforestation and degradation compared with 
Village B. The second section explores the role and perception of local institutions 
operating in the two villages surrounding the Kaimosi Forest. The institutions (i.e. forest-
use rules) for using the Kaimosi Forest are officially implemented, monitored, and 
enforced by both the Quaker Mission Church (QMC) and the Kenyan Forest Service 
(KFS). This section interprets the institutional dimensions of this CPR to better 
understand the factors causing the high levels of deforestation and degradation in Village 
A. The discussion will expand on the main results and discuss how this CPR relates to the 
common property literature presented in Chapter 2.   
 
. 
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Section 1: Household Demography, Land-Use, Livelihood, and Forest-Use 
Characteristics 
 
Village Comparison of Household Demographic Averages 
 
Table 3. Demographic Summary Statistics from Household (HH) Surveys:  
Two Independent Samples t-test: Mean and (S.D.) 
 
HH Demographic 
Variables 
VILLAGE A (n=34) 
High Deforestation 
and Degradation 
VILLAGE B (n=34) 
Low Deforestation 
and Degradation 
 
Mean Total 
(n=68) 
Total Residents per HH 
 
Total Males per HH*  
 
Total Females per HH 
 
Percent Male living in HH 
5.71 
(2.79) 
2.65 
(1.51) 
3.06 
(1.89) 
0.46 
(0.22) 
6.68 
(3.08) 
 
 
6.20 
(2.95) 
3.62 
(2.23) 
3.06 
(1.79) 
0.54 
     (0.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.14 
(1.87) 
3.06 
(1.84) 
0.50 
(0.20) 
Statistically significant at *0.05 level, **0.10 level 
 
Household demographic data is included in this analysis to provide a basic 
understanding of how demographic differences influence village-level patterns in land-
use, livelihood, and forest-use (Table 3).  The data reveals that the total amount of males 
living within the household is significantly higher in Village B (3.62) than Village A 
(2.65, p = .040). Although not significant, Village B has on average one additional 
resident per household (6.68) than Village A (5.71). The next subsection presents the 
household averages regarding land-use and livelihoods in the two villages (Table 4).  
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Village Comparison of Household Land-Use and Livelihood Averages 
 
Table 4. Land-Use and Livelihood Summary Statistics from Household (HH) Surveys:  
Two Independent Samples t-test: Mean and (S.D.) 
 
HH Land-Use and 
Livelihood Variables  
 
 
 
VILLAGE A (n=34) 
High Deforestation  
and Degradation 
VILLAGE B (n=34) 
Low Deforestation 
and Degradation 
 
Mean Total 
(n=68) 
HH property size (acres)**                          
                                          
HH crop size (acres)                                 
                                         
HH agro-forest size (acres)                  
                                       
Crops and Animals 
Total HH corn production 
(kgs)*                                                        
Total HH bean production 
(kgs)                                 
Percent of HHs that own 
chickens            
Average number of chickens 
per HH                                                                       
Percent of HHs that own cows 
Average number of cows per 
HH     
Livelihood 
Livelihood Index (1-19)*         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.19 
(0.93) 
1.05 
(0.91) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
 
70.24 
(80.66) 
18.83 
(31.32) 
0.62 
(0.47) 
5.70 
(6.82) 
0.67 
(0.49) 
1.29 
(1.40) 
7.53 
(1.62) 
1.69 
(1.37) 
1.48 
(1.27) 
0.12 
(0.19) 
 
136.76 
(158.36) 
24.58 
(23.90) 
0.77 
(0.29) 
5.79 
(7.08) 
0.91 
(0.43) 
1.38 
(1.18) 
8.97 
(1.61) 
1.44 
(1.15) 
1.26 
(1.09) 
0.09 
(0.16) 
 
102.20 
(119.51) 
21.75 
(27.61) 
0.69 
(0.38) 
5.75 
(6.95) 
0.79 
(0.46) 
1.33 
(1.29) 
8.25 
(1.62) 
Statistically significant at *0.05 level, **0.10 level  
 
The results reveal several significant differences between villages regarding 
household averages for land-use characteristics and livelihood (Table 4). Results show a 
significantly larger average property size for residents in Village B (1.69 acres), who 
have less perceived deforestation and degradation, compared with Village A (1.19 acres, 
p = .090). 1 Moreover, there is a significantly larger average amount of household corn 
production in Village B (136.76 kgs) compared with Village A (70.24 kgs, p = .040). The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. In this study acres are used since it is the most commonly used local unit of 
measurement regarding property size. 	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results also indicate that household livelihood is significantly higher in Village B (8.97) 
than Village A (7.53, p =.000).  
Thus, the results reveal that Village B households have on average significantly 
more access to land, higher corn production, and a higher livelihood. Key-informants and 
residents suggested several reasons for the differences between the two villages. 
According to a key-informant, a high-ranking member of Village B is a relative of a high-
ranking member of the QMC. Consequently, Village B is the only village (out of the 
seven villages surrounding the forest) that receives piped water from the Kaimosi Forest. 
Residents from Village A explained that the piped water is why Village B is able to have 
more productive crops. Another reason, Village A residents suggested is that Village A’s 
geographic location on top of a large hill allows the wind to more easily damage their 
corn fields. Residents in Village A regularly talked about the significant damage caused 
by the wind. As one resident explained “people spend a lot of time and effort planting the 
cornfields and then lose their entire crop overnight” (Anonymous Interview 2011). 
Although not significant, in general, a higher percentage of residents have more 
cows and chickens in Village B (83.80%) than Village A (64.30%). Cows and chickens 
are the two most common domesticated animals in the region with both villages raising 
livestock. A small amount (<10) of households have other animals such as goats, ducks, 
and donkeys.  
The vast majority of household property in both villages consists of agricultural 
fields. Accordingly, although not significantly different between villages, households in 
both villages have on average a very small amount of agro-forest on their homestead with 
(0.06 acres) in Village A and (0.10 acres) in Village B.  Most agro-forest consists of a 
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small amount (< 20) of blue gum trees (eucalyptus globulus). Residents explained that 
blue gum trees are fast growing and therefore a good source of fuel for cooking. Other 
residents stated that they plant blue gum trees to sell to the Kenyan Government for use  
as electric poles.   
The results show that Village B has a significantly higher average number of 
males per household (Table 3) and a higher average property size (Table 4).  Since 
Village A averages a third of an acre per household resident, the results indicate that 
Village A households may be more likely to place a higher amount of stress on their land.  
Consequently, Village A residents often stated that the access to fertile land is the most 
pressing issue in the area. As one household interviewee commented “there is an issue 
with quality and quantity and the need for fertilizer makes the cost of crop production 
much higher” (Anonymous Interview 2011). Another head of household explained how 
in the past they could allow certain areas of their land to lie fallow, but it is no longer 
possible due to the increase in the local population. The greater access to land allows 
Village B households to have significantly higher crop yields and higher livelihoods. The 
next sub-section presents the results regarding the difference in household forest-use 
averages between villages.  
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Village Comparison of Household Forest-Use Averages 
Table 5. 10 Most Common Plants Collected from the Kaimosi Forest 
Scientific Name Common Name Use 
Harungana madagascariensis Mulondomusala Medicinal  
Ficus lutea Alukhava Medicinal 
Croton macrostachyus Musutsu Medicinal 
Unidentified Shikhutu Medicinal 
Zanthoxyllum gillettii Shikhuma Medicinal 
Triepisium madagascariensis Tsimbalakaya Edible 
Synsepalum cerasiferum Tsikhulumuru Edible 
Unidentified Saga Edible 
Turraua holstii Shirietso Edible 
Basella alba Indelema Edible 
(Maundu, Ngugi, and Kabuye 1999) 
 
During the household surveys, residents identified the 10 most commonly 
collected plants in the Kaimosi Forest (Table 5). This data helps provide an 
understanding of how and why locals utilize forest plants as well as aids in the creation of 
the saliency index (Table 8). The saliency index measures the level of forest dependency 
on forest resources. Since hunting and cutting trees are never permitted, the best 
measurement is the frequency of forest plant collection.  
Over 40 plants were identified during the household surveys; however, most 
residents said it was rare for locals to collect plants other than the ten primary plants 
identified above (Table 5).  For instance, a medicine woman in Village A identified 
numerous medicinal plants that can be found in the Kaimosi Forest, but were only used 
for rare occasions (e.g. uncommon illness or extreme drought). 
 
 
 
61	  
	  
Table 6. Forest-Use Summary Statistics from Household (HH) Surveys: 
Two Independent Samples t-test: Mean and (S.D.) 
 
 
 
HH Forest-Use Variables 
VILLAGE A 
(n=34) 
High Deforestation  
and Degradation  
VILLAGE B 
(n=34) 
Low Deforestation 
and Degradation 
 
 
Mean Total 
(n=68) 
Percent of HHs that collect 
deadwood from the forest** 
Percent of HHs that purchase 
deadwood from the forest** 
HH average number of 10 most 
common forest plants collected  
0.65 
(0.49) 
0.18 
(0.39) 
5.35/10 
(0.16) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
4.23/10 
(0.18) 
0.54 
(0.49) 
0.29 
(0.44) 
4.79 
(0.17) 
Statistically significant at *0.05 level, **0.10 level 
 
The results reveal differences between villages regarding household forest-use 
and plant collection (Table 6). A significantly higher percentage of households collect 
deadwood from the forest in Village A (64.71%) compared with Village B (44.12%, p = 
.029). Consequently, a significantly higher percentage of households in Village B 
(38.24%) purchase deadwood from the local market compared with Village A (17.65%,  
p =.031). Common species of deadwood include Elgon Teak (Olea capensis), Red 
Stinkwood (Prunus africanum), White Stinkwood (Celtis africana), African Satinwood 
(Zanthoxylum gilletti), and White Mahogany (Khaya anthotheca).  These results show 
that deadwood is a vital resource in the region regardless of whether it is collected or 
purchased. When residents were asked what is the best thing about the Kaimosi Forest 
(see Appendix E for household survey), a common response was that it provided 
deadwood. As one local explained “The wind can be bad because it destroys our 
cornfields, but we also like it because it knocks down a lot of branches. Without the wood 
from the forest, I would not be able to cook for my family” (Anonymous Interview 
2011). Furthermore, residents explained that deadwood is increasingly over-harvested.  
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Table 7. H
ousehold (H
H
) C
orrelations of Livelihood, Forest Saliency, and Land-U
se C
haracteristics:  
Pearson’s C
orrelation C
oefficient (n=68) 
   
 Livelihood 
Index 
 Forest  
Saliency Index H
H
 Total 
Property Size 
(acres) 
 Total R
esidents 
per H
H
 
C
orn 
Production 
per H
H
 
 N
um
. of 
C
ow
s per H
H
 
Livelihood Index 
Forest Saliency Index 
H
H
 Total Property Size (acres) 
Total R
esidents per H
H
  
C
rop Production per H
H
 
N
um
. of C
ow
s per H
H
 
N
um
. of C
hickens per H
H
  
 -.077 
.097 
.094 
.277* 
.402* 
.281* 
  -.257* 
.180 
-.263** 
.251 
-.153 
   -.010 
.524** 
.117 
-.027 
    .120 
.398* 
-.043 
     .163 
.049 
      .048 
Statistically significant at the *0.05 level, **0.10 level 
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Pearson’s correlation tests the relationships between the household land-use, 
forest-use, and livelihood variables.  The results show that residents with a higher 
livelihood have significantly higher crop production (.263, p= .030), number of cows 
(.402, p= .001), and number of chickens (.281, p=.020) per household (Table 7).  These 
positive correlations are likely because within these two communities, higher crop 
production and animal husbandry significantly increase the livelihood of the residents. 
For instance, heads of households with multiple cows stated that they are able to sell milk 
to the surrounding households who do not have cows. One resident explained that the 
selling price is very low but it still helps support them financially, because they can sell it 
every day. Results reveal that households with more residents tend to have more cows per 
household (.398, p= .001) (Table 7). This shows that households with higher livelihoods 
and number of residents have the financial ability to invest in more crop production and 
animal husbandry.  
Households with higher forest saliency have a significantly lower property size  
(-2.57, p= .040) and crop production (-.263, p= 0.28) (Table 7). Results indicate that 
having greater access to land and higher crop production allows the households to not be 
as dependent on forest resources. Several residents stated that collecting plants and 
deadwood is not easy due to the over-use. Therefore, residents prefer to buy medicinal 
plants (or similar medicines) and deadwood from the market.  The correlation shows that 
households that have higher crop production and livelihoods are more likely to choose to 
purchase forest resources from the market. Accordingly, although not significant, results 
show that households with higher livelihoods are on average less dependent on forest 
resources (Table 7).   
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Overall the results reveal the household-level differences between villages in 
regards to land-use, forest-use, and livelihood. Results reveal that residents with higher 
livelihoods are more likely to have higher crop production and more cows and chickens 
per household (Table 7). Furthermore, residents with higher forest saliency are more 
likely to have a smaller property size and lower crop production (Table 7).   The 
following section discusses the CPR variables regarding the institutions (i.e. forest-use 
rules) established by the QMC for using the Kaimosi Forest.   
Section 2: CPR Variables: Forest-Use Rules and Institutional Characteristics 
Next, the statistical and qualitative results from the household surveys concerning 
the institutional dimensions operating in the Kaimosi Forest are explored. All local 
residents are allowed to collect edible and medicinal plants and deadwood from the forest 
while abiding by the local institutions (i.e. forest-use rules). The QMC controls the 
Kaimosi Forest land tenure; however, the Kenyan Forest Act of 2005 gives the KFS full 
authority over the management and use of the forest. Regardless of this fact, KFS 
officials do not often monitor or enforce these rules; rather the QMC hires local forest 
guards to patrol inside the Kaimosi Forest boundaries. Therefore, the forest-use rules are 
implemented by the QMC (see Table 8).  The QMC is also the main authority that is in 
charge of monitoring, enforcing, and punishing locals who commit rule infractions.  The 
next subsection presents the differences in household averages between the two villages 
regarding local knowledge and perception of the forest-use rules (table 8). Furthermore, 
the differences between villages regarding the CPR institutions operating within the two 
villages are explored (see Appendix E for household surveys) (Table 9). 
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Village Comparison of Household Knowledge and Perception of Forest-Use Rules 
Table 8. Forest-Use Rules: Summary Statistics from Household (HH) Surveys: 
Two Independent Samples t-test: Mean 
 
 
6 Rules for Using the Kaimosi Forest 
VILLAGEA(n=34) 
High Deforestation 
and Degradation 
 VILLAGE B (n=34) 
Low Deforestation 
and Degradation 
 
Mean Total 
(n=68) 
(1) Collection of all plants and deadwood is 
allowed.  
Percent HHs who knew this rule:  
Level of HH agreement with rule (1-4):  
(2) Tree bark removal is prohibited.  
Percent HHs who knew this rule**:  
Level of HH agreement with rule (1-4):  
Percent HHs heard or seen rule broken:  
Percent HHs perceive rule as being monitored*:  
(3) Permit required for tree cutting. 
Percent HHs who knew this rule:  
Level of HH agreement with rule (1-4): 
Percent HHs heard or seen rule broken**:  
Percent HHs perceive rule as being monitored*:  
(4) Absolutely no hunting in forest.  
Percent HHs who knew this rule:  
Level of HH agreement with rule (1-4):  
Percent HHs heard or seen rule broken:  
Percent HHs perceive rule as being monitored**:  
(5) No charcoal burning in forest. 
Percent HHs who knew this rule:  
Level of HH agreement with rule (1-4)**:  
Percent HHs heard or seen rule broken:  
Percent HHs perceive rule as being monitored:  
(6) No mining in forest. 
Percent HHs who knew this rule:  
Level of HH agreement with rule (1-4)**:  
Percent HHs heard or seen rule broken*:  
Percent HHs perceive rule as being monitored **: 
 
 
 
0.85 
3.72 
 
0.82 
3.89 
0.54 
0.60 
 
0.97 
3.78 
0.97 
0.87 
 
0.85 
3.89 
0.65 
0.76 
 
0.94 
3.76 
0.78 
0.90 
 
0.68 
3.50 
0.50 
0.81 
 
 
 
0.82 
3.72 
 
0.91 
3.84 
0.69 
0.84 
 
0.97 
3.90 
0.85 
1.00 
 
0.82 
3.69 
0.56 
0.55 
 
0.97 
4.00 
0.64 
0.85 
 
0.59 
4.00 
0.21 
0.56 
 
 
 
0.84 
3.72 
 
0.87 
3.86 
0.62 
0.74 
 
0.97 
3.84 
0.91 
0.94 
 
0.83 
3.78 
0.60 
0.63 
 
0.95 
3.88 
0.71 
0.88 
 
0.63 
3.73 
0.34 
0.67 
Statistically significant at *0.05 level, **0.10 level 
(1) Disagree Strongly (2) Disagree Somewhat (3) Agree in General (4) Agree Strongly 
 
Knowledge of the Rules 
  Knowledge of the rules is vital to the success of a CPR because it ensures that 
locals have a clear understanding of how they are allowed to use forest resources 
(Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000). Results reveal differences between forest-use rules 
across villages (Table 8). Rule 2, prohibiting tree bark removal, is the only rule with a 
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statistically significant difference between village means (Village A: 82.35%, Village B: 
91.18%, p =.032).  Although there is not a significant difference between villages 
regarding the other rules prohibiting (rule 2) tree bark removal, (rule 3) cutting trees, 
(rule 4) hunting, (rule 5) charcoal burning, and (rule 6) mining, the results indicate that 
the majority of residents from both villages are aware of the rules (> 60%).  However, a 
small percent of residents are not aware of all the rules for using the forest. In some 
instances, the residents were hearing about the rules for the first time during the 
household surveys. During the key-informant interviews it became very clear that there 
are issues with the rules. For instance, Chiefs, KFS officials, and the QMC all gave 
contradicting definitions of the rules. Some even responded that locals are not allowed to 
use forest resources or to enter the forest boundaries.  
Level of Agreement with the Rules 
In general, residents must agree with the rules in order for commons resource 
management to be successful (Ostrom 1990). The results show that the level of 
agreement regarding rule 5, no charcoal burning in the forest, is significantly higher in 
Village B (4.00) “agree strongly” compared with Village A (3.76, p = .104). The level of 
agreement is also significantly higher for Rule 6, banning mining in the forest in Village 
B (4.00) “agree strongly” compared with Village A (3.50, p = .060). The results 
regarding level of agreement with each rule indicates that the majority of households 
“agree in general” with the rules (i.e. average of all responses were higher than 3) (see 
Table 8).  Furthermore, residents from both villages did not express a strong opinion 
about disagreeing with any of the rules.   
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Rule Infractions 
 To successfully manage CPR resources, residents, in general, must perceive that 
their fellow community members are also following the rules, in order to avoid a free-
rider scenario (Ostrom 1990). In addition, a high level of rule infractions indicates issues 
with the rules in relation to successful commons natural resource management. Asking 
questions about rule infractions is a sensitive subject for residents due to the often severe 
punishment for rule infractions. Residents stated that punishment for less severe rule 
infractions, (rule 3) such as removing bark from a tree, would usually be a warning from 
the forest guards. They explained that it is the guard’s decision whether or not to turn the 
person into the police, where punishment can vary from fines to prison time.  A key-
informant stated that being caught cutting an indigenous tree in the Kaimosi Forest is 
punishable with up to three years in prison. Households were asked if they had seen or 
heard of the rule being broken within the last year. Results show that rule infractions are 
a common occurrence in both villages with the majority of households reporting rule 
infractions (>50%) (Table 8).  A significantly higher percent of residents have heard of 
Rule 3, cutting trees without a permit, being broken in Village A (96.88%) compared 
with Village B (84.85%, p=0.97). Cutting trees without a permit is also the most common 
rule infraction (µ=90.76%).  Furthermore, a significantly higher number of residents have 
heard Rule 6, no mining in the forest, being broken in Village A (50.0%) compared with 
Village B (21.43%, p = .002).  
Several residents from both villages mentioned that some residents could “pay 
off” forest guards for rule infractions.  The only statistical evidence of this was a 
significant positive correlation between livelihood and perceived fairness of rule 
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enforcement (r = .281, p = .024). As one resident cleverly stated, “around here you are 
guilty until proven rich” (Anonymous Interview 2011). Another resident explained that 
they have seen people arrested for cutting trees, and then seen them walking around the 
village the next day.  
Monitoring of the Rules 
Another important attribute regarding the rules is that the residents perceive them 
as being monitored (Table 8). Rule 2 prohibiting tree bark removal is perceived as being 
monitored significantly more in Village B (84.38 %) than Village A (60.00%, p= .039). 
The results show a similar pattern with Rule 3, permit required for cutting trees, where a 
significantly higher amount of resident in Village B (100%) believe the rule is monitored 
compared with (87.10%, p= .033) in Village A. Thus, the results reveal that residents 
from Village A perceive the rules regarding the trees (i.e. bark removal and cutting) to be 
less monitored than Village B.  On the contrary, a significantly higher percent of 
residents perceive Rule 4, banning hunting in the forest, as being monitored in Village A 
(76.00%) compared with Village B (54.55%, p= .095).  Furthermore, the results reveal 
that a significantly higher percent of residents perceive Rule 6, banning mining in the 
forest, as being monitored in Village A (80.95%) compared with Village B (55.56%, p= 
.066).  
Most households know that the QMC hires guards to watch over the forest; 
however, residents also feel that the guards do not monitor each rule consistently. 
Residents explained that the reason Rule 3 (permit for cutting trees) is perceived as being 
more strictly monitored than Rule 4 (no hunting in the forest) is because the QMC 
received no financial gain for protecting the animals, yet they have a high financial 
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investment in protecting the trees because of their potential monetary value. That is, 
locals believe that the QMC is cutting and selling the trees and therefore instruct the 
guards to strictly monitor the trees to prevent locals from cutting them. 
A large percentage of residents repeated that hunting is allowed due to the lack of 
monitoring.  The only mammals that still live in the Kaimosi Forest are the black and 
white colobus monkeys (colobus guereza) and the red-tailed monkeys (Cercopithecus 
ascanius). Residents perceive monkeys to be a nuisance because they eat corn from the 
fields that surround the forest. A key-informant mentioned that the KFS recently caught 
and transported several monkeys to a larger area of the Kakamega Forest due to the lack 
of monitoring and thus high levels of illegal hunting. Next, the results concerning the 
institutional dimensions operating in the Kaimosi Forest are presented. 
Village Comparison of Household Averages Regarding the CPR Institutions 
 
The variables regarding the CPR institutions include level of agreement with rule 
enforcement, adding forest-use rules, participation in rule making, level of perception 
with rules in relation to forest conservation, clearly defined forest boundary, membership 
requirements, invasion issues, and shared vision in conserving the environment (Table 9). 
Each variable represents an institutional characteristic associated with successful 
common property regimes that enable a sustainable people and forests relationship 
(McKean 2000; Vadjunec 2010).  These variables are analyzed to better understand 
complex people and forests dynamics and provide recommendations for lowering the 
levels of deforestation and degradation in the Kaimosi Forest. 
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Table 9. CPR Institutions: Summary Statistics from Household (HH) Surveys: 
Two Independent Samples t-test: Mean and (S.D.) 
 
 
Institutional Characteristics 
VILLAGE A (n=34) 
High Deforestation 
and Degradation 
VILLAGE B (n=34) 
Low Deforestation 
and Degradation 
 
Mean Total 
(n=68) 
 
Overall HH agreement with how the rules 
are enforced (1-4):  
HH belief that new rules should be added 
 (1-4):* 
Percent HH participation in rule making 
process: 
Percent of HHs that perceive forest-use 
rules are conserving the forest:* 
Percent HHs who believe there is a clearly 
defined forest boundary: 
Percent HHs who believe there are 
membership requirements to use forest:*  
Percent HHs who have had issues with HH 
property invasion within the last year: 
Percent of HH Invasion from:    People              
                                     
                                                    Animals 
  
                                                    Both 
 
Belief that village has a shared vision in 
conserving the environment (1-4):  
Saliency Index (1-13):*          
 
2.40 
(1.33) 
2.15 
(1.09) 
0.18 
(0.39) 
0.48 
(0.51) 
0.88 
(0.33) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.88 
(0.33) 
0.72 
(0.50) 
0.39 
(0.39) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
3.24 
(1.12) 
7.26 
(4.71) 
 
2.85 
(1.37) 
1.37 
(1.00) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
0.84 
(0.37) 
0.91 
(0.29) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
0.73 
(0.50) 
0.53 
(0.41) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
2.91 
(1.35) 
5.18 
(2.61) 
 
2.64 
(1.35) 
1.77 
(1.05) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.67 
(0.44) 
0.90 
(0.31) 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.91 
(0.29) 
0.73 
(0.50) 
0.46 
(0.40) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
3.07 
(1.24) 
6.22 
(3.71) 
(1) Disagree Strongly (2) Disagree Somewhat (3) Agree in General (4) Agree Strongly 
Statistically significant at *0.05 level, **0.10 level 
 
Level of Agreement with Rule Enforcement 
 A common characteristic associated with successful CPRs is that residents agree 
with how the rules are enforced (Ostrom 1990). Although not significant, results show 
that residents in Village B (2.85) “agree in general” with the enforcement of the rules 
slightly more so than Village A (2.40) (Table 9). Although the results indicate that the 
average in both villages (µ=2.63) was “agree in general,” several residents told stories of 
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how the QMC guards have mistreated or threatened them.  Furthermore, the residents 
commonly stated that the guards are under-paid and have a reputation for accepting 
bribery for rule infractions. Another issue stressed during the household surveys is that 
residents who want to break the rules can easily do so by predicting the movement of the 
forest guards. That is, the residents can determine when the guards are off-duty or 
patrolling another area of the forest. Several Village A residents explained that the 
biggest disagreement they have with rule enforcement is how Village B residents could 
pay-off forest guards for rule infractions. 
Adding Forest-Use Rules 
 The variable regarding adding forest-use rules sought to determine if residents felt 
there was a significant forest-use rule that should be added.  Results indicate that 
residents in Village A (2.15) have a significantly higher level of agreement that new rules 
should be added compared with Village B (1.37, p = .004) (Table 9). However, the 
overall average between villages “disagree somewhat” that new rules should be added 
(µ=1.77). This shows that although there is a significantly different range of opinions 
present, in general, residents do not believe that adding new rules is necessarily the 
solution for reducing deforestation and degradation.  
Participation in Rule Making 
 Local input is recommended to ensure locals agree with the rules and have a clear 
role in the creation of the rules. Although not significant, a slightly higher percent of 
residents in Village A (18.34%) feel they actually participated in the rule making process 
compared with Village B (12.56%) (Table 9). In fact, the majority of residents from both 
villages have never heard of local residents being included in the rule making process 
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(µ=14.93%). Furthermore, none of the key-informants have heard of resident input being 
considered when creating the forest-use rules.   
Level of Perception with Rules in Relation to Forest Conservation 
 A characteristic of successful CPRs is that locals perceive the rules as conserving 
forest resources. A significantly higher average of residents believe the current forest-use 
rules are conserving the forest in Village B (84.38%) than Village A (48.27%, p= .002) 
(Table 9). A common response by Village A residents was that it is not the rules that are 
causing the high levels of deforestation, but rather the QMC leadership. Residents 
stressed that the KFS should not allow the QMC to enforce and monitor their own forest-
use rules with the lack of supervision. A resident explained that the recent clearing of 
forested land in the Kaimosi Forest for cornfields is a perfect example of how freely the 
QMC operates.  A key-informant explained that a high-ranking government official is 
friends with QMC officials and therefore instructs the KFS to allow the QMC to cut 
indigenous trees in the Kaimosi Forest. A household interviewee stated, “the KFS 
officials identify first as Quakers and secondly as forest guards, and that was why they 
allow the QMC to operate without KFS supervision” (Anonymous Interview, 2011). 
Throughout the fieldwork, it became clear that the conflict between locals and the QMC 
was exasperating environmental issues; when the word “deforestation” was mentioned, 
locals always blamed the QMC leadership of being corrupt before ever mentioning the 
forest-use rules.  
For instance, the majority of residents took time to explain the extensive amount 
of deforestation that they have seen in their lifetime.  One resident explained “when you 
were in the forest several decades ago it took a long time for the rain to reach the ground, 
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now there are so few trees all the rain quickly falls down” (Anonymous Interview 2011). 
This response highlights the significant canopy loss that is occurring throughout the 
forest.  Others residents believe that the QMC is intentionally cutting trees selectively for 
timber harvest throughout the entire forest.  They believe this gives the appearance from 
outside the forest boundaries that the forest cover is still intact, which explains why the 
canopy has evenly spread openings throughout the entire forest.     
Clearly Defined Forest Boundary 
Although not significant, a slightly higher percent of residents in Village B 
(91.83%) believe that there is a clearly defined forest boundary compared with Village A 
(88.26%) (Table 9). Overall, the results indicate that the majority of residents from both 
villages feel that the forest boundary is clearly defined (µ=89.71%). Reflective posts 
surround the entire Kaimosi Forest boundary and therefore demarcated boundaries are 
not an issue in either village. Residents explained that the church primarily placed new 
markers in response to recent encroachment by residents living along the forest 
perimeter.  Although they both acknowledge encroachment to be a growing issue, both 
villages believe there is a clear forest boundary.      
Membership Requirements 
 The attributes for maintaining a successful CPR include having a defined 
membership for using forest resources.  Although not significant, in general more 
residents in Village B (12.23%) believe there is a formal membership requirement for 
using the forest compared with Village A (0.00%).  According to the key-informant 
interviews, the QMC does not impose any formal membership requirements for using the 
Kaimosi Forest. Accordingly, very few residents from either village believe that there are 
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formal membership requirements (µ=6.06%). However, throughout the interview process, 
informal membership rules emerged from discussions regarding deadwood and medicinal 
plant collection. For instance, several interviewees discussed how they would 
occasionally question people they did not recognize within the forest boundaries. 
Residents do not perceive the lack of membership requirements to be a reason for the 
high levels of deforestation and degradation. One resident explained that only locals who 
live within walking distance use the Kaimosi Forest. Several residents suggested that 
there are too many people that are allowed to use the forest. They did not think 
establishing a membership requirement would help, but rather suggested banning all 
locals from using the forest.   
Invasion Issues 
 Although not significant, Village B (52.94%) experiences higher levels of 
household invasion with animals compared with Village A (32.39 %). Red-tailed and 
black and white colobus monkeys are a major issue for residents during the harvest 
season. A resident from Village B explained that since Village B has more forest cover 
near their village, they have a larger population of monkeys living near their households, 
which increases their likelihood of invasion. A similar percentage of residents from both 
villages have had issues with invasion by people within the last year with (72.31%) in 
Village A and (73.67%) in Village B. Locals explained that common invasions by people 
include minor events such as children stealing fruit or vegetables from their crops, or 
more serious crimes such as stealing cows from their home. Overall, issues with invasion 
are a major concern for local residents. However, residents stated that issues with 
household theft does not hinder the feeling of a strong community because locals 
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understand that serious invasion incidents such as stealing cattle are committed by people 
from distant villages.  
Shared Vision in Conserving the Environment 
A characteristic of successful CPRs is that residents have the perception that users 
have a shared vision in conserving the environment (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 
2000).  The perception of residents having a shared vision is important in maintaining a 
successful CPR.  Although not significant, the results show that the majority of 
households in both Village A (3.24) and Village B (2.91) “agree in general” that their 
communities have a shared vision in conserving the environment (Table 9). Residents 
often responded to this question by suggesting that the severe environmental issues are 
not due to a lack of shared vision within the communities, but rather the QMC leadership 
is the one to blame for the high levels of deforestation and degradation. Another common 
response is that the youth do not understand the importance of environmental 
conservation.  Most head of households feel that the older residents have a better 
understanding of the significance of the deforestation and degradation.  Residents 
expressed concern regarding fellow residents who have over-planted blue gum trees near 
the streams without concern for neighbors downstream.  Residents understand that blue 
gum trees consume a large amount of water, which significantly alters the water flow for 
neighbors downstream. Overall, results show that regardless of difference in age, there is 
a strong presence of community cohesion in both villages regarding the importance of 
conserving the environment.   
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Forest Saliency 
 A key characteristic for successful commons resources management is that users 
have a direct saliency on forest resources (McKean 2000). Results show that households 
from both villages moderately depend on the forest for resources such as deadwood 
collection (forest saliency µ= 6.22).  However, Village A residents (7.26) are 
significantly more salient on forest resources (plant and deadwood collection) compared 
with Village B (5.18, p= .027) (Table 9).  
The following discussion gives explains the significant differences between the 
two villages regarding household demographics, land-use, livelihood, and forest-use. In 
addition, the results regarding the institutional dimensions of this CPR are compared and 
contrasted with relevant common property literature.  
Section 3: Discussion 
  
The first section of results regarding household demographics, land-use, 
livelihood, and forest-use reveals several statistically significant differences between the 
two villages. Village B has a significantly higher number of males per household. One 
possible reason for this difference is that Village A males may be more likely to leave 
their home to search for work in urban areas. Regardless of the reason, having more 
males per household helps explain why Village B residents have a significantly higher 
crop production, livelihood, and lower forest dependency. This relationship is seen 
elsewhere in the tropics since more males are available to help in crop production at the 
household-level (Caldas et al. 2007). The households in Village B also have a better 
opportunity at having a higher livelihood by having more employed male family 
members, which are more likely to have higher status jobs. Furthermore, residents in 
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Village A commonly repeated that Village B residents are able to have higher crop yields 
because they are the only village to receive piped water from the Kaimosi Forest.   
Since residents in Village B have a higher average livelihood, there is a 
significantly higher percent of residents who purchase deadwood and medicines in the 
market rather than collecting from the forest. The significantly lower livelihood average 
in Village A also helps explain why Village A has a significantly higher percentage of 
residents who collect deadwood from the forest.  An important detail is that the majority 
of deadwood sold in the market is collected from the Kaimosi Forest. Therefore, even 
though Village B may be locally undergoing less deforestation and degradation, residents 
are still contributing to the overall deforestation and degradation by using the deadwood 
collected by others from the forest.  
The results reveal that this CPR has several strengths and weaknesses for 
maintaining a successful people and forests relationship. Drawing from the theoretical 
framework for creating and maintaining a successful CPR (Chapter 2), the institutional 
characteristics that are strong in both villages include a high level of local knowledge and 
agreement with the rules, resident “agree in general” with rule enforcement, have clearly 
defined boundary lines, and a perceived shared vision among villages in conserving the 
environment.  The main significant positive difference between villages is that Village A 
residents have a significantly higher average forest saliency.  
The results indicate that a positive characteristic of this CPR is a high level of 
local agreement with the rules.  There are several possible reasons for why Village B 
residents have a higher average level of agreement with the rules. First, a lower average 
number of Village B residents who have heard of rule infractions within the last year. 
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Village B also has a lower forest dependency, which means on average Village B 
residents have low forest dependency and thus less interaction with forest guards.  The 
higher agreement level in Village B could also indicate that the rules are better suited for 
residents who have more access to land.  Power dynamics, revealed through the 
qualitative interviews, may also played a role in the differences between villages since 
Village B residents received piped water from the Kaimosi Forest, they were more likely 
to believe that the QMC leadership (and rules) are doing a better job compared with 
Village A residents.  
A local hearing about the rules for the first time during the household surveys 
explains why some rules have a higher percent of people agreeing with the rule than 
actually knowing the rule.  Residents overall agree with the rules; however, making sure 
locals understand the rules is the first step for allowing this CPR to be more successful.  
This indicates that communication of the rules is more of an issue than the actual rules 
themselves.   
Another positive characteristic is clearly defined boundary lines. Ostrom (1990) 
states that locals need to have a clear understanding of the spatial boundaries of the 
resource (e.g. commons forest). Residents understand when they enter the forest; 
however, there is still an issue with locals extending their homesteads into the forest 
boundaries.  Furthermore, community cohesion is strong in both villages.  Residents 
commonly spoke of the high level of reciprocity that exists within the villages.  
The CPR framework presented in Chapter 3 suggests that in order for a CPR to be 
successful (i.e. sustainable), members must have a direct saliency (i.e. dependency) on 
forest resources (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000). The results show a relationship 
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that is somewhat contrary to what the CPR literature suggests.  Although both Villages 
use the forest to varying degrees, the village that has more forest dependency (Village A) 
also is known to have greater issues regarding commons management in terms of greater 
deforestation and degradation. One possible reason for this divergence from previous 
CPR case-studies is that Village B residents have more access to land.  Having more 
access to land less means they are more likely not to be forced to over-use forest 
resources.  
Households with greater access to land have a greater potential to grow larger 
crops.  Since crop production significantly raises the livelihood of households, the 
households with the largest crop productions are also the least salient on the forest.  Thus, 
residents in Village B have a larger average property size and a lower average forest 
saliency.  
In addition, Village A residents having a lower average property size reduces their 
average household crop production and therefore forces residents to be more dependent 
on forest resources. Therefore, the higher saliency in Village A may explain, in part, the 
higher levels of deforestation and degradation. This finding has major implications to the 
success of this CPR.  Overall, Village B residents feel that the QMC institutions are 
properly implemented, monitored, and enforced.  Since Village B residents have more 
access to land and are not forced to depend as heavily on forest resources, a more 
successful and sustainable relationship is maintained between the locals and the QMC. 
Deficient characteristics in this CPR include issues with monitoring and enforcing 
the rules, frequency of rules infractions, local participation in the rule making process, 
formal membership requirements for using the forest, and local perception that rules are 
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conserving the forest. In regards to the deficient characteristics, the main significant 
difference is that Village B residents perceive the forest-use rules to be conserving the 
forest and believe there are membership requirements for using the forest.   
The results indicate that a major issue in effective CPR management is the 
negative perception of how the forest guards monitor the rules. Locals can break the 
forest-use rules when the guards are on the other side of the forest boundaries or off-duty 
(e.g. middle of the night). McKean (2000) states that rules must be designed so guards 
can easily monitor and enforce the rules.  Therefore, a recommendation could be to hire 
more guards or adjust the rules to allow the guards to more easily monitor and enforce the 
forest-use rules. Numerous locals stated that they are regularly mistreated or threated by 
the forest guards.  This relates with Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjew (2000) study, 
where they found that perceived fairness of the rules was a major component in 
conserving forest resources.   
According to CPR theory, a low level of local knowledge regarding the rules 
indicates a major issue in CPR management (Ostrom 1990). This issue is connected with 
the lack of local participation in the rule-making process. The QMC should organize 
community meetings to discuss the rules and listen to the opinions of the locals to solve 
both of these issues. This would likely raise the resident’s level of agreement with the 
rules. Hundreds of locals use the Kaimosi Forest on a daily basis for plant and deadwood 
collection.  It is therefore very important for locals to have a lucid understanding of the 
rules and to be able to participate in the rule making process. The reason that more 
residents in Village B believe there are a formal membership requirements could be from 
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the fact that they do not commonly enter the forest boundaries and therefore assume 
membership is a requirement. 
Local perception that rules are conserving the forest is significantly higher in 
Village B. This result is logical given that village B is undergoing less deforestation and 
degradation and therefore perceives the rules as successfully conserving the forest. On 
the contrary, Village A is undergoing more deforestation and degradation causing 
residents to believe the rules are not working. Although Village A residents significantly 
agree more that rules should be added compared with Village B; both villages overall 
disagree that new rules are the solution to lowering the levels of deforestation and 
degradation. This shows that the main issue is more likely the lack of communication 
between the QMC and locals regarding the rules. 
In early 2011, locals began to voice their opinion regarding the rapid deforestation 
caused by the QMC.  A sanctioned protest was held in the Kaimosi Forest in January 
2011. The locals received permission from the government to conduct the protest; 
however, several locals were still arrested during the event.  Following on Feb 6th, 2011, 
the local government organized a public community meeting (baraza) to discuss the 
deforestation. Government and KFS officials spoke to a large crowd about how the QMC 
was using the Kaimosi Forest. Through informal conversions with locals, most felt that 
the leaders who spoke did not acknowledge the issue of deforestation, but rather talked 
about how the important the QMC was to the local economy. Yet, locals understand that 
the Kaimosi Forest is an important resource and culturally sensitive area for the Tiriki 
people.  
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An estimated 3,000 locals depend on Kaimosi Forest resources for deadwood and 
plant collection. Furthermore, the circumcision ceremony is still seen as a necessity for 
tribal identity. The ceremony requires the young boys to spend one month isolated in the 
forest. Locals fear that they will soon not have a forested area large enough to privately 
conduct the ceremony. Therefore, the locals view the forest as equally important for 
cultural resources.  As one resident stated, “when I looked at the forest it use to make me 
happy, but now I become sad because I know that it is suffering” (Anonymous Interview 
2011) The cultural and livelihood importance of the Kaimosi Forest, along with the 
increasing deforestation and degradation reported by residents and key-informants, 
reveals that successful management of this CPR is important more so than ever for local 
communities. 
Conclusion 
 
The first section of this analysis compared two villages surrounding the Kaimosi 
Forest in terms of household demographics, land-use, livelihood, and forest-use.  The 
comparison of the villages is based off of local authorities who claim that Village A is 
undergoing high levels of deforestation and degradation, while Village B is undergoing 
relatively lower levels. Results indicate that Village B has significantly higher number of 
men per household, property size, corn production, and livelihoods. A significantly 
higher amount of residents in Village A are more likely to collect plants and deadwood 
from the forest compared with Village B.  Accordingly, a significantly higher amount of 
residents in Village B are more likely to purchase deadwood in the market.   
This study reveals an interesting relationship between forest saliency and 
deforestation and degradation issues.  Since Village B residents have on average more 
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access to land and higher livelihoods, they tend to be less dependent on forest resources. 
Since Village A residents are more dependent on forest resources, they appear to have 
more issues with over-using forest resources causing higher levels of deforestation and 
degradation. Overall, issues of poverty and differential land access may explain why 
Village A residents are failing to conserve forest resources. 
The results show that power dynamics between individual actors plays a 
significant role in local perceptions regarding the efficiency of QMC forest management.  
Village B residents receive piped water due to a connection between the QMC leadership 
and Village B leadership. CPR management is more successful in Village B since, on 
average, they have significantly greater access to land.  Regardless of the differences 
between villages, overall there is not a very positive relationship between the QMC and 
local residents. Numerous residents from both villages believe poor QMC leadership is 
the reason for the recent deforestation and degradation, thus showing the importance of 
appropriate governance when managing the commons.  
 Overall, results indicate that this CPR has several weak characteristics. There are 
significant issues regarding communicating, monitoring and enforcing the rules, local 
participation in the rule making process, and formal membership requirements for using 
the forest.  These deficiencies cause a high frequency in rule infractions and a low local 
perception that rules are conserving the forest. Therefore, in order for this CPR to be 
more successful, adjustments include collaborating with locals on how rules should be 
better monitored and enforced, as well as establishing a formal membership requirement 
for using the Kaimosi Forest. This analysis shows that one village (Village B) has less 
interaction with the forest due to a higher average livelihood and more access to land. 
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Therefore, the QMC church and KFS service should also acknowledge the role of poverty 
and access to land when making adjustments to the management plans in order to ensure 
both environmental and social justice.  The next chapter will summarize the intentions 
and main findings of this study, discuss the scope and limitations, and provide 
suggestions for additional research.  
 
85	  
	  
CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Common Property Regimes (CPRs) have successfully managed the collective use 
of natural resources for thousands of years. Within the past several centuries, CPRs have 
been replaced by converting natural resources into private property. This conversion was 
justified to reduce the over-exploitation of common property resources; however, 
empirical evidence shows that CPRs can create a just balance between user exploitation 
and natural resource conservation when local institutions (i.e. rules for using the 
resource) are properly established (Ostrom 1990).  Drawing from common property 
theory and cultural and political ecology (CAPE), the intentions of this study were to 
analyze the role of local institutions on deforestation and degradation in the Kaimosi 
Forest, Western Kenya. This case study contributed to common property theory by 
applying a tested theoretical framework for analyzing common property regimes (Gibson, 
McKean, and Ostrom 2000; Vadjunec 2010) on a unique people and forests relationship. 
The findings of this study will help future researchers better understand how local 
institutions, household decision-making, and power struggles among local actors 
influence natural resource conservation of forests in developing counties. The Kaimosi 
Forest, a small forest fragment of the larger Kakamega Forest (see Figure 1), is  
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undergoing the highest rates of deforestation in the region (Lung and Schaab 2006; 
Bleher, Uster, and Bergsdorf 2006). The Quaker Mission Church (QMC), who owns and 
manages the Kaimosi Forest, allows approximately 3,000 locals to use the forest while 
abiding by the local institutions (i.e. forest-use rules). The Kaimosi Forest was therefore 
an ideal study area to apply Vadjunec’s (2010) framework for analyzing the institutional 
dimensions of a common property regime (CPR) in regards to successful natural resource 
conservation. In addition to analyzing the role of significant attributes for successful 
CPRs, supplementary CAPE perspectives were included to broaden the research to 
include household decision-making regarding land-use and forest-use and local power 
struggles among individual actors. In order to incorporate these research elements, 
fieldwork was carried out in the summer of 2011.  
 The field methods included participant-observation activities, key-informant 
interviews (n=12), and household surveys (n=68). The sampling frame included two 
villages surrounding the Kaimosi Forest in order to conduct a stratified comparison. The 
two villages were selected based off the perception of the key-informants. The first 
village was perceived as undergoing the least deforestation and degradation in the area, 
while the second was perceived as undergoing the most. The household data set was 
quantitatively explored using two statistical methods: independent samples t-test and 
Pearson’s correlations.  The comparative analysis focused on differences in household 
demographics, land-use, livelihood, forest-use, and the role and perception of local 
institutions.  Qualitative data gleaned from open-ended survey questions, participant-
observation activities, and field notes was used to contextualize the quantitative results. 
Chapter 1 provided a historical overview of the area to gain an understanding of the local 
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people, issues with land tenure, and the cultural significant of the forest. Furthermore, 
Chapter 1 reviewed recent human-environment research conducted in the area to show 
that the Kaimosi Forest was undergoing the highest level of deforestation in the area. The 
selected theoretical frameworks (Chapter 2), methodologies (Chapter 3), and results 
(Chapter 4) sought to provide a comprehensive understanding of this people and forests 
relationship. The household demographic and land-use results revealed that Village B 
households had, on average, significantly more males per household, more access to land, 
higher corn production, and a higher livelihood.  
In addition, the results of this study gave insight regarding the strengths and 
weaknesses of this CPR. Institutional characteristics that were strong characteristics 
included a high level of local knowledge and agreement with the rules, residents “agree 
in general” with rule enforcement, clearly defined boundaries lines, and a perceived 
shared vision among villages in conserving the environment. Deficient characteristics in 
this CPR included issues with monitoring and enforcing the rules and frequency with 
rules infractions, local participation in the rule making process, formal membership 
requirements for using the forest and local perception. The main differences between 
villages were that Village B had a significantly lower forest saliency and a significantly 
higher percent of residents that perceived the forest-use rules were conserving the forest. 
The household level analysis showed that increased deforestation did not raise the 
average livelihood (since Village B had less deforestation and a higher livelihood). The 
results showed that since Village A residents had on average less access to land they also 
had more forest saliency on the forest.  The higher saliency forced Village A residents to 
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over-use forest resources, which caused higher perceived levels of deforestation and 
degradation.    
The qualitative data obtained during the fieldwork helped highlight the role of 
individual actors (i.e. QMC leadership, government officials, and KFS officials). Several 
actors from the QMC and KFS leadership played a role in allowing the Kaimosi Forest 
and surrounding villages to undergo such high levels of deforestation and degradation. 
Residents commonly repeated that the high levels of deforestation were caused by the 
QMC leadership cutting and selling the trees. Furthermore, key-informants and local 
residents explained that the KFS officials knew about the illegal removal of indigenous 
trees but intentionally allowed the QMC to operate without supervision.    
  The results showed that a revised management plan is needed from the QMC that 
incorporates the opinions and needs of the local community. Furthermore, the results 
indicated that the QMC has the responsibility to create more specific, organized, and 
sustainable institutions for using the Kaimosi Forest in collaboration with the KFS and 
local leaders. Furthermore, the QMC should be more aware that households with lower 
livelihoods indicators and property size tend to be more salient on forest resources, which 
may ultimately lead to a higher level of deforestation and degradation. Communication 
between the QMC and locals needs to be improved to ensure all residents have a lucid 
understanding of the forest-use rules. A possible solution could be listing the rules on 
signs surrounding the forest. The QMC must take in to consideration the dependency 
locals have on forest resources before the QMC leadership choses to deforest anymore of 
the remaining forest.  
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Scope and Limitations 
 The intentions of this study were to contribute to common property theory by 
analyzing a unique people and forests relationship in Western Kenya.  The scope of this 
analysis was broadened to include CAPE perspectives by including household decision-
making and the role of power struggles among individual actors.  The sampling size 
represented a relatively small population (n=68) of residents living in two villages out of 
the total seven surrounding the Kaimosi Forest.  The sampling technique was opportunist 
rather than completely random. Consequently, the results of this analysis possess 
limitations for representing the entire population living near the forest.  
 A possible limitation in the research design was also that the indicator for Village 
A undergoing higher levels of deforestation and degradation was based off the perception 
and expert opinion of the key-informants.  However, the key informants unanimously 
stated that Village A was undergoing the most deforestation and degradation and Village 
B was undergoing the least.  Furthermore, key-informants held important roles as local 
authorities in the region. Additionally, my experience in the field corroborated their 
stratum. Regardless, a biophysical and/or remote sensing analysis would have been 
beneficial in selecting the two sampling sites.  
 Another limitation was the small amount of time (ten weeks) living in the area. 
Ten weeks was a sufficient amount of time to conduct the proposed amount of key-
informant interviews and household surveys; however, it would have been beneficial to 
live in the area for a longer period of time. I had originally proposed to hold a community 
meeting prior to beginning the household surveys. Due to lack of funding and the 
extremely high population density in the area, I decided to not hold the meetings within 
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the villages. Instead, I made a strong effort in the market area to meet people and explain 
my intentions as a student and human-environment researcher.  
 Hiring two research assistants that were trilingual college students was a major 
key to my success in the field. They helped explain cultural norms and traditions that 
prevented me from making mistakes while interacting with locals. Some examples 
included always shaking hands when meeting a person and yelling “hodi!” when 
approaching a homestead.  
 A major obstacle during the surveys was explaining the necessity of the required 
information.  A common issue was explaining how land-use questions, such as the 
number of domesticated animals on the homestead, related to studying deforestation and 
degradation.  Consequently, a major limitation in analyzing the data was the issue of 
missing data. Throughout out the surveys, I continued to become more skilled and 
comfortable with asking questions.  However, the first several surveys had a relatively 
large amount of missing data. The missing data significantly altered the analysis of this 
research by inhibiting the originally proposed binary logic regression analysis.  My 
research assistants had a comprehensive understanding of the research intentions and 
therefore became experts at articulating to the participants why we were asking such 
detailed questions.  Overall, the surveys were the most challenging and yet rewarding 
task completed in the field. With these valuable lessons, experiences, and insight in mind, 
I am excited for the opportunity to continue my career as a “muddy boots” geographer. 
Future Directions for Additional Research 
 Future research could consist of expanding the sample size to include more 
villages surrounding the forest. This would allow the study to more adequately analyze 
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the issues with deforestation and degradation in relation with local land-use, livelihood, 
and forest-use.  In addition, randomizing the samples in each village would allow for a 
more robust comparison between villages.  The Kaimosi Forest is a small fragment of the 
Kakamega Forest and is undergoing the highest level of deforestation in the area.  
Therefore, conducting a study using a similar theoretical framework on another area of 
the Kakamega Forest would be very beneficial for comparing the institutional dimensions 
with a more successful CPR. Additional research could also include a remote sensing 
analysis on the Kaimosi Forest in order to help researchers and local government leaders 
properly monitor the levels of deforestation and degradation.  Furthermore, more studies 
should be conducted regarding the role of the Kenyan Forest Service and the Kenyan 
Forest Act of 2005 in relation to the deforestation occurring across the country. 
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Appendix D: Key Informant Interviews 
Survey # _____________Interviewer:__________________  Date: _________________ 
Position/Title of the Interviewee _____________________Location: ________________ 
ENVIRONMENT 
What are the major environmental issues in the Kaimosi Forest (deforestation, water, soil, 
overuse of forest resources)? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
LAND-USE 
What are the major land-use or land tenure issues in the Kaimosi Forest area?  ________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
In your opinion, have any Kaimosi Forest communities had conflicts with any of the 
following issues in the last 5 years: 
Conflict Type Yes/No  
Land /Title Y   N  
Selling Property Y   N  
Hunting Y   N  
Timber Extraction Y   N  
NGO Y   N  
Other 
Communities 
Y   N  
Forest Use Rules Y   N  
Water Y   N  
Soil Erosion Y   N  
FOREST MANAGEMENT RULES 
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What are the main community organizations in the Kaimosi Forest Area? ____________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
What are the main institutions responsible for monitoring/enforcing/ and punishment of 
forest use rules in the Kaimosi Forest (QMC, traditional leaders)? __________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
In your opinion, are there certain membership requirements for using the Kaimosi Forest?  
Yes  No   If yes, what is the eligibility for membership? __________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Do locals participate in the rule making process? Yes  No  Explain: _________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
How are the rules of forest use monitored in the Kaimosi Forest? __________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
What are the most common forest use rules that are broken in the area? _____________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
In general what is the punishment for breaking forest use rules? ____________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you agree or disagree that new rules should be added?  (1-4)*___ Explain? 
_________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*(1) No, disagree strongly (2) No, disagree somewhat (3) Yes, agree in general (4) Yes, 
agree strongly  
Village with the most amount of environment problems (Deforestation and Degradation) 
1.__________________________________ 2. __________________________________ 
3.__________________________________ 
Village with the least amount of environmental problems (Deforestation and 
Degradation) 
1.__________________________________ 2. __________________________________ 
3.__________________________________ 
Most organized village in the Kaimosi Area? 
1.__________________________________2. __________________________________ 
3.__________________________________ 
Least organized village in the Kaimosi Area? 
1.__________________________________2. _________________________________ 
3.__________________________________ 
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Appendix E: Household Surveys 
Survey # ___________Interviewer:__________________  Date: __________________ 
Village name: ________________________ Location: __________________________ 
GENERAL INFORMATION: 
 
* Education Level: (P) Primary (S) Secondary (C) College 
* Resident: Son, Daughter, Cousin, Aunt, Uncle, Nephew, Niece, Friend or Other. 
Are you a full time resident?    Yes     No    If no, please indicate, where/when: ________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
How long have you been a resident? __________________________________________ 
EDUCATION: 
Name of the school(s) your family attends? ____________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Distance to school: __________________  Travel time to school: ___________________ 
MOBILITY: 
Mode of 
Transportation 
Rarely Less 
Often 
Often Most 
Often 
Walk     
Bicycle     
Motor Bike     
Private Car     
Public (busi, matatu)     
Other:     
Permanent 
Residents  
Age Education 
Level 
Permanent 
Resident 
Age Education 
Level 
Mother      
Father      
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Distance to nearest hospital/clinic: ______Travel time to nearest hospital/clinic: _______ 
Distance to nearest market: _____________Travel time to nearest market: ____________ 
Distance to forest: ____________________Travel time to forest: ___________________ 
LAND-USE: 
Total Acres Owned: _________________  Total Acres Rented: ____________________ 
Land-Use  Acres Crops Produce (kg) Consume (kg) Sell (kg) Price 
Pasture   Beans         
Agriculture   Maize         
Perennials   Cowpeas         
Primary 
Forest 
  Bananas         
Secondary 
Forest 
  Chi/Tea         
   Coffee         
  Sugarcane         
            
            
            
 
Animals Number 
Owned 
Number  
Rented 
Number Consumed  Number Sold  Price 
Chickens   Every  
3 Months: 
Every  
3 Months: 
 
Goats    Yearly:  Yearly:  
Cattle    Yearly:  Yearly:  
Pigs    Yearly:  Yearly:  
Sheep    Yearly:  Yearly:  
        
        
 
Animal Products Consumer Sold Price 
Eggs Per month: Per month:  
Milk Per month: Per month:  
Cattle hide Yearly: Yearly:  
Sheep skin Yearly: Yearly:  
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What types of garden plants do you have? Cabbage_____Pumpkins_____Kales ____ 
Other:__________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Other 
Employment:_____________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
FOREST USE 
* Frequency of Extraction:  (D) Daily (W) Weekly (BW) Biweekly (M) Monthly  
(L) Longer than Monthly 
Do you feel that non-timber forest products have decreased, increased, or stayed the 
same in the last 10 years? __________________________________________________ 
Extractive  Forest 
Products  
(Fruits, Nuts, 
Medicinal Plants) 
Frequency 
of 
Extraction* 
Quantity per 
Month 
Do you sell 
this 
product? 
Quantity 
Sold per 
Month 
Price 
Honey 
 
  Y     N   
 
 
  Y     N   
 
 
  Y     N   
 
 
  Y     N   
 
 
  Y     N   
 
 
  Y     N   
 
 
  Y     N   
 
 
  Y     N   
 
 
  Y     N   
 
 
  Y     N   
 
 
  Y     N   
 
 
  Y     N   
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If decreased, what types ________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 HOUSEHOLD ASSESTS 
Stove type:  Gas Wood Other:  ________________          
Water source: Stream  Well  Other: ____________ 
Roof type:  Iron Sheets  Tiles  Grass  Other: _____ 
Electric type:  Solar  Generator  Hydro  Other: ___ 
Floor type: _______________________________ 
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION 
What local organizations are you involved with? 
Community Organization Years as a 
member 
Frequency 
of meetings 
per year 
Currently Active  
(Last Vote) 
Yes/No 
Satisfaction  
Level* 
(1) Quaker Mission Church     
(2)     
(3)     
(4)     
(5)     
(6)     
*Satisfaction Level:  (1) Strongly Unsatisfied (2) Unsatisfied (3) Satisfied (4) Strongly 
Satisfied 
Reasons for not being satisfied/Comments about organizations?____________________ 
(1)____________________________________________________________________________ 
Assets Yes/No Quantity 
House Phone    Y   N  
Cell Phone Y   N  
Television    Y   N  
Radio Y   N  
Ice Box         Y   N  
Vehicle  Y   N  
Couch (Sofa) Y   N  
Chainsaw Y   N  
Table Y   N  
Fence Y   N  
Water Filter Y   N  
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(2)____________________________________________________________________________ 
(3)____________________________________________________________________________ 
(4)____________________________________________________________________________ 
(5)____________________________________________________________________________ 
FOREST MANAGEMENT RULES 
Overall, do you agree with the forest use rule?  
(1) No, disagree strongly (2) No, disagree somewhat (3) Yes, agree in general (4) Yes, 
agree strongly  
Why or why not? ______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Forest Use Rules Do you 
know 
this 
rule? 
(Y/N)  
Do you 
agree 
with 
rule? 
(1-4)* 
In your 
opinion, do 
you think 
this rule is 
being 
monitored? 
(Y/N) 
Have you heard 
of someone in the 
community that 
has broken this 
rule (in the last 
year)? (Y/N) 
What happens 
when someone 
breaks this rule? 
(1)      
(2)      
(3)      
(4)      
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(5)      
(6)      
(7)      
(8)      
*(1) No, disagree strongly (2) No, disagree somewhat (3) Yes, agree in general  
(4) Yes, agree strongly 
In your opinion, do you feel that there is a clearly defined boundary for the Kaimosi 
Forest?  Yes No_______________________________________________________________ 
In your opinion, do you agree or disagree with how the rules are being enforced?  
(1) No, disagree strongly (2) No, disagree somewhat (3) Yes, agree in general  
(4) Yes, agree strongly 
 
Why or why not: _______________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Are there certain membership requirements for forest use?    Yes    No   If yes, please  
 
explain _______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you feel the membership requirements are fair?  Yes   No   Please explain __________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Have you or anyone in the community experienced any issues with invasion?   Yes    No   
If yes, please explain:___________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
Do/Did you have any participation in the rule making process?   Yes    No  If yes, please 
explain: ______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
In your opinion, what rules do feel need to be changed? _____________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you agree or disagree that new rules should be added?  (1-4)*___ Explain? _________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
*(1)No, disagree strongly (2)No, disagree somewhat (3)Yes, agree in general 
(4)Yes, agree strongly 
 
Do you feel that the forest use rules are preserving the forest?  Yes   No    Why or why 
not? __________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
In your opinion, what is the biggest environmental issue facing this community (water, 
soil erosion, deforestation, other)?________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
In your opinion, what is the best thing about the Kaimosi Forest? _____________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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